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OPENING THE DOOR TO "HARD-LOOK" 

REVIEW OF AGENCY PREEMPTION 

KAREN A. JORDAN* 
Preemption of state tort actions by federal regulatory schemes, 
especially products liability actions, poses recurring federalism con­
cerns. This Article revisits the problem, with a focus on the chal­
lenging issue of identifying whether a particular case of asserted 
preemption should be attributable to Congress or to the agency.1 
The issue is important because characterizing a case as one of pre­
emption by the agency can open the door to an appropriate level of 
scrutiny into the decision to preempt: a mode of review akin to the 
hard-look review used in other areas of judicial review of agency 
action. When trying to identify the source of the intent to preempt, 
courts should use a totality of the circumstances approach. A court 
should take into account any relevant evidence, but especially evi­
dence relating to whether the precise agency activity giving rise to 
the preemption was devised or envisioned by Congress, or by the 
agency itself, through a regulatory scheme clearly going beyond 
specific directives detailed by Congress. 
Using the FDA's recent assertions of preemption arising from 
its market-approval decisions for prescription drugs, this Article il­
lustrates how a totality of the circumstances analysis can lead to an 
appropriate characterization of the source of the intent to preempt. 
The analysis probes the evolution of federal drug regulation, con­
trasting the limited nature of Congress's role with the ever-ex­
panding nature of the agency's role in the regulation of prescription 
drug labeling. Additionally, the analysis takes into account the fre­
quently emphasized yet often discounted fact that the agency re­
cently changed its view of the preemption issue. In the case of the 
* Professor of Law at the Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville. 
The author is grateful for the research help provided by Karin Irwin, JD, University of 
Louisville, 2009 LLM candidate, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. 
1. The issues introduced and discussed briefly in this section of the Article have 
been addressed by the author in greater depth. See generally Karen A. Jordan, Agency 
Preemption and the Shimer Analysis: Unmasking Strategic Characterization by Agencies 
and Giving Effect to the Presumption Against Preemption, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 69 [herein­
after Jordan, The Shimer Analysis]. 
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FDA's assertion of preemption, a totality of the circumstances anal­
ysis points strongly to the appropriateness of characterizing the 
agency as the source of preemption. 
Notably, that conclusion has failed to surface in the plethora of 
recent lower court cases addressing the issue of preemption arising 
from FDA approval decisions.2 It has failed to surface because 
courts and litigators have followed the agency's lead in characteriz­
ing the issue as a matter of congressional intent to preempt. Rather 
than merely following the agency's lead-which enables the agency 
to sidestep accountability for preemption decisions made by the 
agency-it is crucial to carefully analyze the circumstances and to 
properly identify those instances when, realistically, it is the agency 
that is the source of the intent to preempt. 
This Article also briefly demonstrates the importance of hard­
look review when the source of the intent to preempt is the agency. 
Hard-look review requires courts to engage in a rigorous scrutiny of 
the agency's authority. In the case of the FDA, careful historical 
analysis of federal drug regulation brings to light issues relating to 
the authority of the FDA to regulate prescription drug labeling, at 
least in the comprehensive way that the FDA today regulates such 
labeling. Specifically, careful analysis reveals that the delegation of 
authority to the FDA relating to the content of prescription drug 
labeling is largely a matter of inference and acquiescence. Because 
a hard-look review can serve as a proxy for a "presumption against 
preemption," such evidence can provide sound reasons for a court 
to decline to uphold the agency's decision that preemption of state 
tort law is warranted. 
Importantly, the key points made in this Article have ramifica­
tions beyond the context of the FDA's recent assertion of preemp­
2. For example, the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine, 
129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the case in which the Court decided to address the issue of 
preemption arising from the FDA's market-approval decisions for prescription drugs, 
have all argued the case as one of congressional intent to preempt. See, e.g., Brief for 
Petitioner at *26-29, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 
2273067; Brief for Respondent at *25-29, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 
WL 3285388; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
*10, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2308908; Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Constitutional & Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Respondent at *4, Wyeth, 
129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851604; Brief of the National Conference of 
State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at *24-26, Wyeth, 129 S. 
Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851606; Brief of Torts Professors Mark P. Gergen & 
Michael D. Green as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at *11, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 
1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851610; Brief of Amici Curiae Vermont et al. in Support 
of Respondent at *3, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851613. 
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tion. The issues arise in any case involving an assertion of 
preemption of state law due to agency regulatory activity and, in­
deed, the reasoning of the various Justices in Wyeth v. Levine high­
lights the need to reorient judicial analysis in this area.3 
Reorienting the analysis is important because, if the source of pre­
3. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187. In Wyeth, the Court held that the FDA's approval 
of the drug label at issue did not preempt plaintiff Levine's state law products liability 
action. The majority's analysis focused heavily on the issue of whether the FDA's view 
of the preemption issue-as articulated in the preamble to the 2006 Final Rule-was 
entitled to deference. See FDA Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for 
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). The majority decided that it was not, in part 
because the FDA's analysis was "suspect" (because it was inserted into the preamble 
without the issue being raised in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), but also because 
the agency failed to provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation for its dramatic shift in 
position. Id. at 1201 (applying Skidmore deference). See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 124 (1944). In analyzing the issue of conflict preemption, the majority made two 
findings. First, the majority decided that there was no "'actual conflict'" between the 
FDA's approval decision and the state law action because insufficient evidence existed 
showing that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with federal labeling duties and any 
state law duty that would be imposed by Levine's tort claims. Id. at 1192 (citations 
omitted). Second, the majority decided that the state law claims would not "stand as an 
obstacle" to the purposes or objectives of the federal labeling law because Congress in 
1906 decided against including a federal remedy and Congress in later years did not 
enact a preemption provision as to labeling law. Id. at 1204. Notably, the majority did 
not raise the issue whether the case should be treated as a case involving agency pre­
emption and, in fact, suggested that the whole notion of agency preemption was inappli­
cable. The majority noted that this was not a case in which the purported preemption 
arose from agency regulation or other agency action with the force of law. Id. at 1203. 
The dissent correctly recognized that the asserted preemption in the case certainly 
did arise from agency action-the adjudicative labeling decision. Id. at 1218 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). Moreover, the dissent confirms the importance of carefully identifying 
cases of agency preemption. According to the dissenting Justices, the FDA's approval 
decision-because it rested on some weighing by the FDA of the risks and benefits 
involved-ipso facto preempted any state law that might result in a drug manufacturer 
reweighing the risks and benefits and opting to use a label that, in the manufacturer's 
view, might be a safer label. Id. at 1220 (noting that "ordinary principles of conflict 
preemption turn solely on whether a State has upset the regulatory balance struck by 
the federal agency"); id. at 1227 (noting that "[g]iven the 'balance' that the FDA struck 
between the costs and benefits of administering Phenergan via IV push, Geier compels 
the pre-emption of tort suits (like this one) that would upset that balance"); see also 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
In both the majority and the dissenting opinions, the Justices approached the pre­
emption question in such a way that issues of the agency's authority and the appropri­
ateness or reasonableness of preemption were left out of the analysis; a concern alluded 
to though not fully fleshed out in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion. See id. at 1205 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the flaws in the Geier decision as grounded in the 
Court's failure to recognize a limitation on the agency's authority contained in the text 
of the statute). The Wyeth decision thus reinforces the need to reorient judicial analysis 
in the area of agency preemption. 
356 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:353 
emption is the agency, rigorous judicial review becomes a necessary 
safeguard for federalism concerns. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING THE TOTALITY OF THE 

CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE 

OF THE INTENT TO PREEMPT 

Agency action must constitute a valid exercise of delegated 
power, and thus all agency activity must conform with congressional 
intent.4 However, in effectuating congressional intent, agencies 
often act with distinct agency intent. That is, agencies sometimes 
have goals and objectives underlying their actions that are distinct 
from, although in alignment with, congressional objectives.5 In 
cases addressing preemption of state products liability law by fed­
eral agency activity, the possibility of distinct agency intent has 
been found relevant in two distinct ways. In some cases, agency 
objectives have been the trigger for implied conflict preemption; 
that is, preemption arising because a state law "stands as an obsta­
cle" to federal objectives reflected in the agency's regulatory 
scheme.6 In these cases, courts and agencies have treated the pre­
emption as arising from congressional intent.7 In other cases, an 
agency may have asserted that the preemption was grounded not in 
congressional intent to preempt but in the agency's intent to 
preempt.8 
The distinction is important because the Supreme Court tradi­
tionally has analyzed the issue of preemption differently depending 
on the source of the intent to preempt. Identifying the agency as 
the source of the intent to preempt opens the door to more rigorous 
judicial review of the appropriateness of preemption.9 Thus, a key 
threshold task in the preemption analysis when preemption arises 
4. See Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) 
("Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judg­
ments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his 
statutory authority or acted arbitrarily." (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 
381-82 (1961»). 
5. See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. 861 (involving a motor vehicle regulation promul­
gated to promote specific objectives deemed important by the agency but were beyond 
Congress's central objective of vehicle safety). 
6. Id. at 873 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)); see also Gade 
v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). 
7. See generally Geier, 529 U.S. 861; Gade, 505 U.S. 88; Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). 
8. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988); Capital Cities Cable, 
Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (citing de La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54). 
9. See infra notes 21 to 33 and accompanying text. 
2009] "HARD-LOOK" REVIEW 357 

from agency rules or adjudicative decisions is the proper identifica­
tion of the source of the intent to preempt. 
Courts and litigants, however, have generally failed to address 
the issue, tending instead to simply cast the issue as one of congres­
sional intent-often following the agency's lead in characterizing 
the issue. The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) recent as­
sertion of preemption provides a case in point. Beginning in 2000, 
the FDA has aggressively asserted that its market-approval deci­
sions for prescription drugs preempt state tort claims grounded in 
failure to warn. lO In 2006, the FDA more formally asserted its "ma­
tured" view in the Federal Register announcing a Final Rule (2006 
Rule) amending certain aspects of the FDA's regulation of the con­
tent and format of prescription-drug labeling.!l According to the 
FDA, its duty to ensure that drugs are safe and effective includes 
considerations relating to risk management and, thus, the labels on 
approved prescription drugs constitute the agency's "formal, au­
thoritative conclusions" about what constitutes the right balance of 
risk and benefit with regard to information communicated to health 
practitioners.12 Further, in contrast to its prior view that it was not 
problematic if products liability laws might cause manufacturers to 
make conservative labeling decisions, the FDA asserted that state 
law civil actions cause defensive labeling and undermine the pur­
pose of labeling on prescription drugS.13 The FDA broadly asserted 
that products liability actions threaten the FDA's statutory role as 
the expert responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs-and the 
content of their labeling-and that state laws that frustrate the 
FDA's objectives were therefore preempted.14 The FDA asserted, 
10. The movement was initiated when then chief counsel for the FDA affirma­
tively involved the FDA in several civil suits filed by plaintiffs injured by such drugs. In 
these lawsuits the FDA asserted a seemingly new view that its labeling decisions pre­
empted the state-law claims at issue. See, e.g., Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to 
Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at A1 (reporting the administration's 
position that "consumers cannot recover damages for [injuries caused by prescription 
drugs and medical devices] if the products have been approved by the [FDA]" and 
citing Justice Department briefs in which the administration acknowledged that this 
position reflects a "change in governmental policy"); see also Jordan, The Shimer Anal­
ysis, supra note 1, at 72 n.9. 
11. See FDA Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Pre­
scription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). 
12. Id. at 3934. 
13. Id. at 3935. 
14. Id. at 3934-35. 
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in essence, the variant of conflict preemption that resembles field 
preemption. IS 
Importantly, the FDA has pointed to Congress as the source of 
the intent to preempt. Throughout the 2006 Rule, the FDA consist­
ently pointed to potential conflicts with the statute as the key reason 
for the preemption. For example, the FDA claimed that "products­
liability suits have directly threatened the agency's ability to regu­
late manufacturer dissemination of risk information ... in accor­
dance with the act"; that "[s]tate law actions can rely on and 
propagate interpretations of the act and FDA regulations that con­
flict with the agency's own interpretations and [thUS] frustrate the 
agency's implementation of its statutory mandate"; that courts have 
wrongly interpreted the statute by characterizing the FDA labeling 
requirements as representing a minimum safety standard; that, "[i]n 
fact, FDA interprets the act to establish both a 'floor' and a 'ceil­
ing'...."; that, "[g)iven the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation" 
under the statute, additional disclosures of risk "are not necessarily 
more protective of patients," since they can "disrupt the careful and 
truthful representation of benefits and risks"; that overwarning 
"potentially discourag[ es] safe and effective use of approved prod­
ucts or encourag[es] inappropriate use," thereby "undermining the 
objectives of the act"; and that state actions allow the FDA's statu­
torily prescribed, centralized, and expert determinations to be 
usurped by individualized reevaluation by lay judges and juries.16 
The agency asserted, essentially, that its preemption of state 
laws is what Congress intended. That is, that Congress intended 
this type of adjudicatory determination to preempt the field of risk 
disclosure in prescription-drug labeling. Courts and litigants ac­
cepted that characterization,17 but that approach is misguided and 
inconsistent with key Supreme Court precedent.18 The approach is 
misguided because it allows agencies to sidestep accountability for 
preemption decisions. That is, characterizing the case as one of 
congressional intent to preempt triggers a traditional preemption 
analysisI9 wherein the issue becomes largely a matter of statutory 
15. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (discussing a type of 
field preemption arising from the stands-as-an-obstacle branch of conflict preemption); 
see also Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992). 
16. FDA Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescrip­
tion Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934-35 (emphasis added). 
17. See supra note 2. 
18. See Jordan, The Shimer Analysis, supra note 1, at 110-16. 
19. In analyzing the question of preemption by Congress, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally emphasized three categories of preemption. See, e.g., English, 496 U.S. at 
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interpretation, thereby requiring an examination of the text, struc­
ture, purpose, object, and underlying policy of the statute_20 What 
is often missing from the analysis is meaningful scrutiny of the 
agency's authority as to the particular agency activity and of the 
reasonableness or appropriateness of what may have been a sweep­
ing preemption decision by the agency_ 
Yet, the Court has used a different analysis in cases where the 
agency is identified as the source of preemption; that is, cases 
where, even if Congress was silent about preemption, an agency de­
cided that preemption was necessary to carry out its mission.21 In 
cases where the preemption is grounded in an agency's expressed 
intent to preempt, the Supreme Court traditionally has used a dis­
tinct analysis.22 The reason for the different analysis is that if the 
agency has expressed its intent to preempt, the case is one of ex­
78-79; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Robert B. 
Leflar & Robert S. Alder, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Lia­
bility Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 694 (1997) (noting that courts 
addressing a preemption issue recite, "like a mantra, a formulaic incantation of black­
letter law"). Those categories are express preemption, implied preemption, and im­
plied conflict preemption. See English, 496 U.S. at 78 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). In turn, two variants of conflict 
preemption exist. The Court has found preemption where it is impossible to comply 
with both state and federal law or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom­
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." [d. (citing 
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Da­
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941». 
20. See generally Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Concep­
tual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149 (1998). 
21. For example, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp involved the Federal Commu­
nication Commission's (FCC) decision that federal preemption of state and local regu­
lation was necessary and proper in order to effectuate Congress's mandate to foster and 
promote "a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communication 
service." Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 783 (1984) (quoting 47 U.S.c. 
§ 151 (2000»; see also In re Amendment of Part 76, 49 F.C.C.2d 470, 478 (1974). After 
notice and comment on the issue, and consideration of arguments on both sides, the 
FCC announced, "we now find that there is a necessity to rationalize, interrelate, and 
bring into uniformity the myriad standards now being developed by numerous jurisdic­
tions. We, therefore, are pre-empting the field of technical standards ...." In re 
Amendment of Part 76, 49 F.C.C.2d at 480. 
22. This distinction was articulated by the district court of Maryland in National 
City Bank of Indiana v. Turnbaugh: 
There are two related but analytically distinct frameworks that may be applied 
in determining whether the [agency] regulations validly preempt state law. 
While Congressional intent is critical to both methods of analysis, the focus of 
each is somewhat different, depending on whether the agency has issued a 
regulation interpreting existing law [Le., the statute] or has determined to issue 
a pre-emptive regulation pursuant to its delegated authority. 
Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 367 F. SUpp. 2d 805, 814 (D. Md. 2005), affd, 463 
F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2096 (2007). 
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press rather than implied preemption. As such, the question for the 
court is not whether it is proper to infer congressional intent to pre­
empt but, rather, whether the agency's decision should be upheld. 
The issue presented is not a matter of statutory interpretation but, 
instead, a matter of judicial review of an agency's policy decision. 
This analysis was first used by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Shimer.23 Under Shimer, the two-pronged inquiry for re­
view of an agency decision to preempt requires a court to assess 
whether the agency acted within the scope of its authority and, if so, 
whether the decision to preempt was reasonable.24 As the Court 
later explained in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, if the agency 
"choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting poli­
cies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we 
should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legisla­
tive history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would 
have sanctioned."25 While at first blush sounding highly deferen­
tial, the Shimer analysis actually opens the door for an appropri­
ately rigorous level of scrutiny.26 Precisely because the analysis 
shifts to one of judicial review of an agency's policy decision, Shi­
mer provides a means for holding accountable agencies that have 
decided that state law interferes with a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme put in place by the agency. 
In fact, the Shimer analysis can be readily described as a type 
of hard-look review.of agency action; i.e., as involving a rigorous 
review akin to that formally established by the Court in Motor Vehi­
cle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co,27 Although technically within the ambit of the arbitrary and 
23. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961). United States v. Shimer is gener­
ally identified as the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized "agency or regu­
latory" preemption. See Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia! 
Chevron Era, 59 U. PIlI'. L. REV. 805, 820 (1998); Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with 
Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 823, 854-55 (1995). 
24. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383. 
25. Crisp, 467 U.S. at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fid. Fed. 
Says. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982)); see also City of New 
York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988). 
26. See Jordan, The Shimer Analysis, supra note 1, at 118-34 (carefully analyzing 
Shimer and the Supreme Court cases following the Shimer approach-Louisiana Public 
Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, and de la Cuesta, 458 
U.S. 141). 
27. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). 
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capricious standard of review,28 a hard-look review requires a court 
to search for the rationale and reasoning underlying the agency's 
decision.29 The premise underlying hard-look review is that requir­
ing the agency to satisfactorily explain the data used, the findings 
made, and the connection between the findings and the policy deci­
sion will result in better decisions.3o At the same time, the mode of 
review allows a type of substantive check on an agency's policy de­
cisions. What seems rational to the agency may not seem rational 
to a reviewing court.31 Thus, as recently noted: 
28. Under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), many agency deci­
sions cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless found to be arbitrary and capri­
cious. See 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(a) (2000). In applying the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review, a court accords some deference to the agency's decision. See State 
Farm, 463 U.S. at 45. 
29. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. The State Farm Court set out the standard as 
follows: 
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory ex­
planation for its action including a "rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made." In reviewing that explanation, we must "con­
sider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors 
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Normally, an agency 
rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an impor­
tant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The 
reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies: 
"We may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency 
itself has not given." We will, however, "uphold a decision of less than ideal 
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 
419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 
168 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 
30. This type of hard-look review is premised on the understanding that courts 
may not impose additional procedural requirements on agencies. See VI. Yankee Nu­
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (holding 
that courts are restricted in their ability to impose additional procedures because the 
APA explicitly details the procedures that federal agencies must use as they engage in 
various agency actions). Thus, courts have instead required proof that the agency has 
adequately engaged in the procedures set forth in the APA. Id. at 547. For example, 
the APA requires agencies to "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general state­
ment of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.c. § 553(c). Courts may not add to this re­
quirement. But, in applying hard-look review, courts may ensure the adequacy of the 
agency's explanation of the "basis and purpose" underlying new rules. Vt. Yankee Nu­
clear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524. 
31. At the same time, if the decision is rational and well explained, a reviewing 
court cannot set aside the agency decision just because the court concludes that another 
decision would be more rational. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 549. 
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Twenty-two years prior to the State Farm decision, the Court's 
analysis in Shimer was similar. The Court's inquiry included a 
two-fold review, including an assessment of both (1) the scope of 
the agency's general rule-making authority and (2) whether the 
decision to preempt could be reconciled with congressional in­
tent. As to the second assessment, the Court conducted a search­
ing inquiry into the agency's reasons for disregarding state law 
and affirmatively ensured consistency with goals legitimately at­
tributed to Congress. The Court upheld the decision as reasona­
ble only after ensuring that-and explaining how-the decision 
to forgo state-law protections operated to benefit both the VA 
and veterans. It is therefore reasonable to characterize Shimer as 
establishing a type of hard-look review for agency decisions to 
preempt state law: a review that allows a court to scrutinize both 
the procedural and the substantive aspects of an agency decision 
to preempt state law.32 
As a type of hard-look review, the Shimer analysis can serve the 
function of a presumption against preemption in the context of 
agency preemption.33 
As noted, the ability to use hard-look review hinges on a find­
ing that the source of the intent to preempt is the agency, and not 
Congress. It therefore becomes crucial to properly identify the 
source of the intent to preempt. The key to correctly identifying 
the source of the intent to preempt is to use a totality of the circum­
stances approach. A totality of the circumstances analysis has not 
been used in recent years, likely due to the Supreme Court's ap­
proach in Geier v. American Honda Motor CO. 34 Yet, empowering 
courts to label a case as one of agency preemption whenever a to­
tality of the circumstances so indicates would open the door to a 
more appropriate hard-look scrutiny of preemption arising from the 
32. See Jordan, The Shimer Analysis, supra note 1, at 123 (noting that, as part of 
the analysis, the Court looked for evidence that preemption would further the congres­
sional purpose of providing benefits for veterans). 
33. See id. at 134-38. As the author noted recently: 
A presumption is an evidentiary tool. Its function relates to the burdens of 
proof allocated to parties involved in litigation. In the context of preemption 
grounded in congressional intent, the presumption operates by heightening 
the burden of producing evidence of congressional intent. The essence of the 
Shimer analysis is similar. An agency's assertion of preemption must survive 
heightened judicial scrutiny of the totality of the evidence that bears on the 
authority underlying it, and the reasonableness of, the agency action. 
Id. at 136. 
34. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co, 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See generally Jordan, 
The Shimer Analysis, supra note 1, at 94-97, 110-112 (providing a detailed analysis of 
this decision). 
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activities of federal agencies. Using the FDA's recent position on 
the preemption issue as an example, this Article next illustrates 
how a totality of the circumstances approach can help in properly 
identifying the source of the intent to preempt. 
II. 	 ApPLYING A TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ApPROACH 
TO THE RECENT FDA ASSERTION OF PREEMPTION 
Under a totality of the circumstances approach, the task for a 
court is to decide whether the relevant facts and circumstances 
demonstrate that the intent to preempt reasonably can be attrib­
uted to the agency, rather than to Congress. Intent to preempt rea­
sonably can be attributed to the agency in a variety of 
circumstances, for example, 
[a]s in Shimer, it could be circumstances where the regulatory 
scheme-or the agency activity-that warrants preemption is a 
comprehensive scheme put in place by the agency, especially 
when the agency action clearly goes beyond any specific direc­
tives detailed by Congress. All regulatory schemes must, of 
course, be put in place pursuant to the charge given to the agency 
by Congress. However, if the predominant trigger for preemp­
tion is federal law devised by the agency-[a regulatory scheme 
involving] rights and duties created by the agency-it would be 
appropriate to view the matter as one of agency preemption.35 
This would be particularly true when the text of the statute and 
its legislative history lack clear indicators of congressional intent to 
preempt. In such cases, a more realistic assessment of the circum­
stances is that the agency intended to preempt state law. A totality 
of the circumstances approach would also allow courts to take into 
account any other evidence relevant to the question of the source of 
preemption. 
Given this, in conducting a totality of the circumstances analy­
sis courts must first identify, with precision, the agency activity that 
purportedly triggers preemption. Scrutiny of the FDA's assertions 
of preemption of common law drug labeling actions reveals a dual 
source of preemption. First, the specific agency action that is the 
source or trigger of the purported preemption is the FDA's ap­
proval to allow a drug manufacturer to market its drug.36 The ap­
35. Jordan, The Shimer Analysis, supra note 1, at 115-16. 
36. The FDA decision regarding the content of the labeling of prescription drugs 
was made as part of the decision to allow the drug to be marketed. See infra note 86 
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proval decision is an adjudicative decision.37 An adjudicative 
decision generally would give rise only to conflict preemption.38 
Yet the FDA is asserting, in essence, a variant of field preemption. 
Although cast largely in terms of conflict preemption due to frustra­
tion with federal objectives, the FDA's many supporting reasons 
collapse into the central idea that the approval decision sets the 
"'floor' and [] 'ceiling'" for disclosure of risk information.39 Field 
preemption ordinarily cannot arise from an adjudicatory decision 
unless a second source exists that supports a broader scope of pre­
emption. As noted, throughout the 2006 Rule, the FDA consist­
ently pointed to potential conflicts with the statute as the key 
reason for the preemption.40 That, however, is not sufficiently pre­
cise for a totality of the circumstances analysis. 
Rather, under a totality of the circumstances approach, courts 
must delve deeper and assess whether the purported conflict arises 
from the statute or, rather, from a regulatory scheme developed by 
the agency that clearly extends beyond any specific directives de­
tailed by Congress in the text of the statute. When the regulations 
and accompanying text. See generally Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemp­
tion: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.c. L. REV. 1089 (2007). 
37. See Jordan, The Shimer Analysis, supra note 1, at 104. 
38. The actual decision or order resulting from an adjudication-that is, the 
agency action that represents application of the law to the facts-of course creates 
rights and duties that are binding on the agency and the parties to the proceeding. See 5 
U.S.c. § 551(4) & (6) (2000) (the APA's definitions of "order" and "rule" make clear 
that an "order" has the present effect of creating rights and duties as to the particular 
parties to the adjudication). An adjudicative decision thus has the force of law and 
thereby may have a preemptive effect. However, adjudicative decisions would seem to 
give rise only to implied conflict preemption. Agency decisions are drafted with find­
ings and conclusions as to specific issues involved in the proceedings and are directed to 
parties to the proceedings. Thus, agency decisions reflected in orders would seem 
rarely, if ever, to be drafted in a way that would give rise to express preemption of state 
laws or implied field preemption. Yet an agency order could readily trigger implied 
conflict preemption if enforcement of a state law (including a judgment or order from a 
state court or administrative tribunal) would create an impermissible conflict for a party 
subject to the order. Of course, an adjudicative decision could have a broader preemp­
tive scope if that is what Congress or the agency intends. In such a case, however, it is 
not the adjudicative decision itself that creates the broader preemption. Rather, the 
source of broader preemption would be the statutory scheme or regulatory scheme that 
expressly or impliedly establishes that the decision will have a broader preemptive ef­
fect. In such cases, a dual source of preemption exists. See Jordan, The Shimer Analy­
sis, supra note 1, at 86. 
39. FDA Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescrip­
tion Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codi­
fied at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601); see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text for a 
summary of the FDA's reasoning. 
40. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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triggering preemption reflect a regulatory scheme largely devised 
by the agency-as opposed to mere "parroting regulations"41­
sound reasons support characterizing the source of the intent to 
preempt as the agency. The assessment requires careful study of 
the evolution of the statutory and regulatory schemes involved. In 
the case of the FDA's recent assertion of preemption, the pertinent 
statutory and regulatory schemes have evolved and expanded over 
the course of the last century. A totality of the circumstances anal­
ysis also looks to other evidence, and other important evidence ex­
ists in this case; namely, the fact that the FDA and many courts for 
decades took the opposite position on the issue of preemption. 
A. 	 The Text of the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act of 1938 and 1ts 
Amendments: Broad Discretion within Carefully 
Delimited Bounds 
Because the basic parameters of agency regulation of prescrip­
tion drugs were in place by 1980, this Article focuses on the regula­
tory scheme put in place by Congress from the inception of its 
regulation of drugs through the 1962 amendments.42 In analyzing 
the extent to which the basic regulatory scheme of prescription 
drugs was devised by Congress, the text of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA)43 and its amendments is scrutinized 
primarily for the specific directives put in place by Congress. Also, 
because it becomes relevant in cases of agency preemption, the 
analysis highlights the scope of authority delegated to the agency. 
1. The 1906 & 1938 Statutes 
The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 set the stage for the FDCA. 
The 1906 Act criminalized the manufacture, shipment, or receipt 
41. Notably, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between regulations 
that merely "parrot the statute" and regulations that reflect a use of the agency's exper­
tise and experience. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). Where the 
agency activity reflects a "parroting regulation," it remains reasonable to attribute pre­
emptive intent to Congress. Id. 
42. Amendments after 1962-most notably, amendments made in 1988, 1997, and 
most recently in 2007-may have a place in the preemption analysis, but they are rele­
vant largely as some evidence of Congress's acquiescence to the FDA's regulation of 
prescription drug labeling. The amendments included new directives and delegations of 
agency authority regarding the content of labeling following approval. At most, the 
1997 drug modernization amendments supply some notion of a congressional objective 
of what the FDA perhaps has recently referred to as the goal of achieving the "optimal 
use" of drugs. 
43. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000)). 
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"within any Territory or the District of Columbia [of] any article of 
food or drug which is adulterated or misbranded."44 The 1906 Act 
defined "drugs" to include "medicines and preparations recognized 
in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary," as 
well as any substance or mixture thereof "intended to be used for 
the cure, mitigation or prevention of disease."45 
The 1906 Act carefully defined what circumstances would con­
stitute adulteration or misbranding. Adulteration included drugs 
sold under a name recognized in the Pharmacopoeia, but that dif­
fered from approved standards for "strength, quality, or purity"­
unless the difference was plainly stated on the drug's container-or 
if a drug's strength or purity fell below the standards represented.46 
A drug was misbranded if its label bore a false or misleading state­
ment about the article or its ingredients; if it was an imitation; if it 
failed to bear a statement regarding the amount of certain danger­
ous ingredients (alcohol, morphine, opium, cocaine, heroin, etc.); or 
if its label included a false or fraudulent statement regarding its 
"curative or therapeutic effect."47 
The remainder of the 1906 Act dealt with enforcement by the 
agency. Congress delegated significant investigative and adjudica­
tory authority to three distinct agencies.48 In addition to the spe­
44. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 1, 34 Stat. 768, 768 
(repealed 1938). The 1906 Act also prohibited and criminalized selling or offering for 
sale in the District of Columbia or the Territories of the United States, and the export­
ing or offering to export to any foreign country, adulterated or misbranded food or 
drugs. Id. § 2. 
45. Id. § 6. The United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) is a private association that 
deems itself the "official public standards-setting authority for all prescription and over­
the-counter medicines" manufactured or sold in the United States. About USP-An 
Overview, http://www.usp.orgiaboutUSP/index.html(last visited Apr. 15,2009). USP is 
an independent, science-based public health organization whose goal is "[tlo improve 
the health of people around the world through public standards and related programs 
that help ensure the quality, safety, and benefit of medicines and foods." Id. 
46. See Pure Food and Drugs Act § 7. 
47. See id. § 8. The prohibition on a false statement regarding a drug's curative 
or therapeutic effect was added to the Act in 1912 via the Sherley Amendment. See 
Sherley Amendment, ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416, 417 (1912). 
48. See Pure Food and Drugs Act § 4 (directing the Bureau of Chemistry of the 
Department of Agriculture to conduct examinations of food and drug specimens); id. 
§ 5 (imposing a duty on any district attorney to initiate appropriate judicial proceedings 
when sufficient evidence of a violation is presented); id. § 11 (directing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to police importation by delivering to the Secretary of Agriculture samples 
of drugs that are being imported). The 1906 Act also provided for the seizure and 
disposition of adulterated or misbranded articles, and for appropriate due process. Id. 
§§ 4, 10-11. Furthermore, the 1906 Act provided a defense for a dealer who could es­
tablish a signed guaranty to the effect that articles were not adulterated or misbranded. 
Id. § 9. 
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cific directives to various agencies, the 1906 Act included a general 
delegation of rulemaking authority. The Act provided as follows: 
"[t]hat the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
and the Secretary of Commerce and Labor shall make uniform 
rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this Act, 
including the collection and examination of specimens of foods and 
drugs ...."49 Although at first blush appearing broad, the delega­
tion is tied to what is necessary to carry out the Act, and the Act 
itself is narrow. Congress defined, in a limited way, circumstances 
that constituted adulteration and misbranding of drugs. The thrust 
of the Act was to ban the sale of drugs that were not what they 
purported to be, including a ban on drugs whose labels did not dis­
close substances known to be dangerous.5o In terms of agency au­
thority over drugs, then, the 1906 Act basically authorized 
enforcement activity. 51 
In the FDCA, agency authority was expanded but still carefully 
limited.52 The FDCA similarly prohibited and criminalized the 
marketing of adulterated and misbranded drugs in interstate com­
merce.53 Regulation of drug safety was strengthened, however, by 
prohibiting the marketing of a new drug without an "effective" ap­
plication and expanding the ways in which drug labeling could con­
49. /d. § 3. 
50. See Mary J. Davis, The Final Battle for Preemption: The FDA and Prescription 
Drug Labeling Product Liability Actions 15 & nn.66-69 (Berkeley Elec. Press, Working 
Paper No. 1591, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.comlcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
7331&con text=expresso. 
51. Agencies were authorized to monitor for and identify violations and, if found, 
to remove the offending articles and impose the penalties set forth in the Act. Most 
violations were identifiable through testing, which involved comparing actual strength, 
quality, and purity with standards established by a private association or with the stan­
dards set forth on the label. Whether statements were false or fraudulent was deter­
mined by way of judicial proceedings. 
52. Most sections of the FDCA took effect twelve months after the date of its 
enactment. The 1906 Act was repealed upon the effective date of the FDCA. See Fed­
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 301-392 (2000)). 
53. Like the 1906 Act, the FDCA prohibited a variety of activities, such as "[t]he 
introduction or delivery for introduction" and the "receipt" in interstate commerce of 
adulterated and misbranded drugs. [d. § 301(a)-(b). The FDCA also banned the act of 
adulteration in interstate commerce, and the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded 
drugs within any territory, as well as falsely giving a guaranty; forging or falsely repre­
senting without authority any mark, tag, or label "authorized or required by regula­
tions; refusing to cooperate with enforcement proceedings as required; wrongfully using 
trade secret information acquired via enforcement proceedings; and altering, destroy­
ing, or obliterating the whole or any part of the labeling while in interstate commerce." 
[d. § 301. 
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stitute misbranding and, thus, be in violation of federal law.54 To 
enable pre-market agency review, the FDCA defined "new drugs"55 
and prohibited persons from introducing or delivering for introduc­
tion into interstate commerce "any new drug, unless an application 
filed ... is effective with respect to such drug."56 As part of the 
application, the applicant was asked to describe the composition 
and manufacturing of the new drug, to provide samples of the drug 
and its components, to provide specimens of the proposed labeling, 
and to provide full reports of investigations made to show whether 
the new drug was safe for use.57 
Importantly, however, the application automatically became 
effective on the sixtieth day after the filing of the application unless 
the Secretary of Agriculture postponed the effective date for study 
of the application.58 As a procedural matter, this scheme put the 
burden on the Secretary to preclude the marketing of a new drug 
through an adjudicatory process. Further, the statute spelled out 
and thus limited the reasons that would support a refusal to allow 
an application to become effective.59 The Secretary could issue an 
order refusing the application to become effective only finding, af­
ter notice and hearing, a cause specified by Congress. Such causes 
include: the reports of investigations failed to incll;lde adequate tests 
to show that the drug was safe for use under the conditions pre­
scribed in the proposed labeling; the results of tests showed that the 
drug was unsafe-or that there was insufficient evidence to deter­
mine whether the drug was safe-for use under the conditions pre­
scribed in the proposed labeling; or the manufacturing controls 
were inadequate.6o 
54. Id. § 30l. 
55. The FDCA defined "new drug" as "[a]ny drug ... not generally recognized, 
among experts qualified ... to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the 
conditions prescribed ... in the labeling" unless the drug was previously subject to the 
1906 Act-or a drug that had become so recognized due to clinical trials, but which had 
not "been used to a material extent or for a material time" under the conditions pre­
scribed in its labeling. Id. § 201(p). The definition of "drug" was also expanded to 
include "articles intended to affect the structure or any function of the body," and arti­
cles intended as components of drugs. Id. § 201(g). 
56. Id. § 505(a) (emphasis added). 
57. Id. § 505(b). 
58. Id. § 505(c). Section 201(d) defined Secretary to mean the Secretary of Agri­
culture. Id. § 201(d). 
59. Supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
60. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 505(d). The Secretary was 
also empowered to suspend an application that had become effective, or to revoke an 
order refusing to permit an application to become effective. See id. § 505(e)-(f). 
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The FDCA's gate-keeping function for new drugs-section 
50S-was a significant expansion of agency authority and a signifi­
cant step in helping to ensure the safety of new drugs. But, the 
agency's adjudicatory authority over new drugs under section 505 
was nonetheless carefully delimited. In particular, it is noteworthy 
that the adequacy of labeling was not one of the specified causes 
that would allow the agency to preclude an application from be­
coming effective. Further, although the FDCA also reauthorized 
agency authority over drugs already on the market, the scope of 
that authority continued to relate primarily to enforcement of the 
prohibition on adulterated and misbranded drugs.61 
Notably, however, the agency's enforcement authority over la­
beling of drugs already on the market was increased by way of the 
FDCA's expansion of what constituted a "misbranded" drug.62 The 
FDCA expanded the definition of misbranding to include, inter 
alia: (b) a failure to include on the label "an accurate statement of 
the quantity of the contents"; ( c) a failure to include "any word, 
statement, or other information required by or under the authority 
of [the FDCA] to appear on the label"; (f) a failure to include "(1) 
adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate warnings against 
use ... where its use may be dangerous to health, or against unsafe 
dosage or methods or duration of administration or application, in 
such manner and form, as are necessary for the protection of 
users"; and (g) if the drug is represented as a drug "recognized in an 
official compendium," a failure to package and label the drug as 
described in the compendium.63 
61. Specifically, the FDCA provided for judicial proceedings in federal district 
courts for enforcement of penalties for violations, to restrain violations, and to seize 
and dispose of misbranded or adulterated articles, as well as for initiation of such pro­
ceedings by way of a report by the Secretary of Agriculture to any United States attor­
ney. It further added administrative and judicial remedies for orders refusing to allow 
an application to become effective. See id. §§ 302-305. 
62. Id. § 201(n). The FDCA also defined "label" and "labeling." The term "la­
bel" was defined to mean a display of printed or graphic matter 
upon the immediate container of any article; and a requirement made by or 
under authority of this Act that any word, statement, or other information 
appear on the label shall not be considered to be complied with unless such 
word, statement, or other information also appears on the outside container or 
wrapper, if any there be, of the retail package of such article, or is easily legi­
ble through the outside container or wrapper. 
Id. § 201(k). The term "labeling" was defined to mean "all labels, and other written, 
printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or 
(2) accompanying such article." Id. § 201(m). 
63. See id. § 502(b)-(c), (f)-(g). More specifically, for a drug recognized in the 
United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) (and not offered as a homeopathic drug), mis­
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These provisions constituted, in essence, an express delegation 
of interpretive and enforcement power over certain aspects of a 
drug's labeling. However, the message was mixed. The provisions 
also stated that, for any drug recognized in "an official compen­
dium," section 502(g) required labeling "as prescribed therein," 
thereby reflecting a specific recognition by Congress of the appro­
priateness of private sector decisions regarding the content of label­
ing.64 At the time, there was a close relationship between the 
United States Pharmacopoeia (USP), a private association, and the 
FDA, with some understanding that the USP could develop a com­
pendium that would then effectively control drug labeling.65 Al­
though the compendium concept never developed, its inclusion by 
Congress in the text of the statute raises questions about Congress's 
view of the scope of the agency's authority over the content of 
labeling.66 
The statutory provisions specifically addressing rulemaking au­
thority similarly fail to show congressional intent to give the agency 
unlimited authority over the precise content of the labels on drugs 
marketed in interstate commerce. The authority that most specifi­
cally pertains to the content of labels is an authority "to exempt" 
branding occurs with a failure to comply with packaging and labeling requirements of 
the United States Pharmacopoeia. Id. § 502(g). 
64. Id. § 502(g). 
65. See U.S. Pharmacopoeia, USP History, http://www.usp.orgiaboutUSP/history. 
html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). A timeline put together by USP notes that in 1938 
"USP, NF, and Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia standards of strength, quality, purity, 
packaging, and labeling [were] recognized as official and enforced by FDA." Id. (NF is 
the National Formulary, a book of standards published by the USP). 
66. Interview with Alexander M. Schmidt, Commissioner of Food and Drugs 
1973-76, in Chi., III. (Mar. 8-9, 1985), http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/ 
schmidt/part3.html (explaining that one reason that the compendium concept never got 
off the ground was due to the FDA's concerns about letting go of its authority over 
labeling). Schmidt commented that 
FDA had the labeling regulations and, of all the tools FDA has, one of the 
most valuable is the labeling regs. The use of those regs became a very fine 
art. And the people who were sophisticated and good enough to understand 
the use of the labeling regs, fended off any challenge to the agency's authority 
to declare what was a proper or an improper label. The compendium issue for 
a large segment of FDA was that FDA, if it gave up its authority to label, 
would be giving up the whole ship. Giving to some outside, even quasi-gov­
ernmental group ... USP, whoever. To give up to them the authority to la­
bel-which in effect was what the compendium was-would be giving away 
the ship. 
Id.; see also Interview with J. Richard Crout M.D., Dir. of FDA's Bureau of Drugs 
1973-82, in Rockville, Md. (Nov. 12, 1997), http://www.fda.gov/oc!history/oralhistories/ 
croutlpart3.html (explaining the agency's decision to ask the USP to take over "antibi­
otic specs"). 
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drugs from requirements devised by Congress. Section 502, which 
defines the circumstances under which a drug can be misbranded 
authorizes the Secretary to "promulgate regulations" that exempt 
certain drugs from the requirement that a label bear "adequate di­
rections for use," if the directions are unnecessary for the protec­
tion of the public health.67 Similarly, the Secretary can exempt 
drugs dispensed by prescription from certain labeling requirements 
so long as the drug's label includes other specific limited 
information.68 
As with the tenor of the 1906 Act, other key rulemaking provi­
sions relate to enforcement. Section 701(a) is the most general 
grant of rulemaking authority in the FDCA. It provides that "[t]he 
authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of 
this Act ... is hereby vested in the Secretary."69 However, the 
authority to promulgate regulations necessary for enforcement is a 
limited authority. Such a delegation generally is not construed as 
including substantive rulemaking authority'?o Agencies entrusted 
with enforcement authority generally are limited to ensuring that 
duties imposed by Congress are carried out. For example, the 
FDCA empowered the agency to decide when a label on a drug on 
the market is "false or misleading," or has failed to include the di­
rections and warnings required by Congress. In the enforcement 
action or per rules, the agency could develop general principles or 
standards relating to the statutory standards. Efficient enforcement 
67. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 502(f). 
68. See id. § 503(b). The label must include "the name and place of business of 
the dispenser, the serial number and date of such prescription," and the name of the 
prescribing physician. Id. § 503(b )(2). 
69. See id. § 701(a). Section 702 addresses examinations and investigations, and 
subsection (b) authorizes the Secretary to make "reasonable exceptions from, and im­
pose such reasonable terms and conditions relating to," the collection of samples for 
analysis. Id. § 702(b). Section 902, which addressed the effective date of the FDCA, 
provided that section 701 would become effective immediately on enactment and that, 
"thereafter, the Secretary is authorized ... to (1) conduct hearings and to promulgate 
regulations which shall become effective ... as the Secretary shall direct." Id. § 902(a). 
70. In cases in which courts have stated otherwise, the courts have not been pre­
cise. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1182-83 (D. Del. 1980). The 
key point that courts have addressed relating to the FDA's rulemaking authority is that 
the FDA has authority to impose duties via rulemaking as opposed to the adjudication 
process. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620 
(1973) (noting the appropriateness of "particularizing statutory standards" through 
rulemaking); Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger 512 F. 2d. 688, 696 (2d Cir. 
1975) (noting that "if the administrative process is to be practically effective, specific 
regulations promulgated pursuant to a general statutory delegation of authority must be 
treated as authoritative, whether labeled 'substantive' or 'interpretive' "). 
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also often requires that agencies create rules relating to procedures. 
Section 701(a)'s delegation of enforcement power, however, is 
clearly distinguishable from other delegations in the FDCA in 
which Congress expressly instructed the agency to promulgate 
regulations.71 
Thus, the text of the FDCA-as to both the agency's rulemak­
ing authority and the section 505 adjudicatory authority over new 
drugs-reflects careful and specific decisions delimiting the 
agency's authority over the content of prescription drug labeling. 
Because section 701(a) was drafted in a more restrictive way than 
the general rule making delegation in the 1906 Act,n it is fair to 
characterize the FDCA as delegating substantial authority and dis­
cretion to the agency, but-at least as to the content of labeling­
within carefully delimited bounds. 
2. The 1951 and 1962 Amendments 
Congress amended the FDCA's approach to prescription drugs 
in 1951. The Humphrey-Durham Amendments (HDAs) specified 
that drugs that could not be used safely except under appropriate 
medical supervision could be dispensed only upon a proper written 
or oral prescription, or an authorized refill.73 Further, though, the 
amendments expressly exempted prescription drugs from some of 
the labeling requirements of section 502-specifically the require­
ment that the label bear "adequate directions for use" and "ade­
quate warnings against [dangerous] uses"74-but required use, 
before dispensing, of a "cautionary legend" advising of the drug's 
prescription status.75 
71. This understanding is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. See 
5 u.s.c. § 553(b) (2000) (exempting interpretive rules and rules of agency procedure or 
practice from the requirements of notice and comment). 
72. The 1906 general rulemaking delegation provided that "the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce and Labor shall 
make uniform rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this Act, includ­
ing the collection and examination of specimens of foods and drugs." Pure Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 3, 34 Stat. 768, 768-69 (repealed 1938). 
73. See Humphrey-Durham Amendments, ch. 578, § 1,65 Stat. 648, 648-49 (1951) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 353 (2000)). The text and legislative history of the 
HDAs are of central importance to the issue of preemption arising from the FDA's 
market-approval decision for prescription drugs. However, the discussion and analysis 
of the HDAs are presented infra Part II.B.2, because they are better understood in the 
context of the agency's regulatory initiatives. 
74. Humphrey-Durham Amendments § 1; see infra note 146. 
75. Humphrey-Durham Amendments § 1 (amending subsection 503(b) of the 
FDCA by adding subsection (4): "A drug which is subject to paragraph (1) of this sub­
section shall be deemed to be misbranded if at any time prior to dispensing its label fails 
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Important amendments were also enacted in 1962. Although 
often touted as a significant expansion to federal drug regulation, 
the 1962 amendments to the FDCA do not significantly bear on the 
issue of preemption that is being explored in this Article because 
the scope of the agency's authority over the content of prescription 
drug labeling was expanded in only a limited way.76 Three key 
changes were made by the 1962 amendments. Congress directed 
the FDA to assess the "effectiveness" of drugs, required drug man­
ufacturers to offer more robust evidence supporting their claims, 
and precluded marketing of new drugs without a specific FDA-ap­
proval decision. In the 1950s, dangerous drugs such as thalidomide 
entered the market despite the application process put in place by 
the FDCAJ7 In addition to a lack of resources and the difficulty of 
taking action within sixty days of the filing of an application, key 
FDA decision makers focused on the pharmacology of new drugs 
and their chemical behavior and on how the drugs were promoted, 
rather than on clinical evidence relating to drug safetyJ8 Over the 
course of several years, congressional hearings brought to light the 
lack of scientific rigor in the drug application process.79 The result-
to bear the statement 'Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without 
prescription' "). 
76. In particular, the 1962 amendments did not change the risk assessment aspect 
of the approval process. Under the FDCA as enacted in 1938, the FDA engaged in an 
assessment of "relative risk, balancing benefit with risk." See Jeffrey E. Shuren, The 
Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 302 (2001) (noting, however, that even with the addition of the 
duty to assess for effectiveness, the FDA cannot approve an ineffective drug, even if it 
poses no health risks). 
77. Thalidomide is a medication that causes severe birth defects when taken by a 
pregnant woman. See Thalidomide: Important Patient Information, U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, www.fda.gov/cder/news/thalidomide.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2009). 
78. See Interview with William W. Goodrich, FDA Office of the General Counsel 
1939-71, in Rockville, Md. (Oct. 15, 1986), http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/ 
goodrich/default.htm. 
79. Goodrich explained that Kefauver initiated hearings to investigate antitrust 
violations due. to concern about the high cost of drugs. Id. Goodrich noted that, al­
though the drug companies testified as to the cost of clinical research and the cost of 
advertising and "education" as the reason for high drug costs, further investigation re­
vealed deficiencies in the research and promotion of drugs. Id. Regarding research, 
Goodrich stated that 
anyone who had looked at any of the New Drug Applications knew, as I knew, 
that that was all baloney, and what they were saying to us in those early days 
was essentially a bunch of testimonials. The way drugs were investigated, a 
physician from the company would go out in the community with some sam­
ples and say to the doctor, "I've got this new drug for so-and-so. Here's some 
samples. Try it out and let us know how you like it." And they would get back 
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ing amendments in 1962 were an attempt to address those particu­
lar deficiencies in the FDA's practices in assessing drugs. 
As a matter of procedure, the agency was provided greater 
power during the new drug application (NDA) process. The 
amendments provided that no "new drug" could be marketed un­
less an "approval" of the NDA was effective.80 Thus, rather than 
automatically becoming effective if no action was taken, obtaining 
an effective NDA required agency action. A statutory time frame 
was still in place, but it was longer-ISO days-and if the agency 
was not ready to approve within this period, the agency was em­
powered to simply give the applicant the opportunity for a hearing 
on whether the NDA was approvable.81 
As a matter of proof, the amendments modified the FDCA by 
requiring NDAs to include reports of investigations showing not 
just the drug's safety, but also the drug's effectiveness in use.82 Fur­
ther, they allowed the Secretary to refuse approval of an applica­
tion based on deficiencies in the type of testing or the results of 
testing.83 As to test results, the Secretary was empowered to assess 
not just safety, but also effectiveness.84 Moreover, greater scientific 
rigor would be required in assessing effectiveness. The amend­
ments authorized the Secretary to refuse approval of an NDA if 
[e]valuated on the basis of the information submitted to him as 
part of the application and any other information before him 
with respect to such drug, there is a lack of substantial evidence 
that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to 
have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling thereof ....85 
The expansion of authority over the content of labeling was 
similarly tied to approval of an NDA. The amendments added a 
a letter from him: "I tried it out on eight patients and they all got along fine." 
That's the kind of stuff that was coming for the science. Of course, that was 
completely unsatisfactory, and as soon as people focused on that, that raised 
the problem. 
[d. Regarding the cost of "educating" physicians, the companies later reversed them­
selves "saying none of it was educational-nobody believed it, and therefore, it was no 
reason to require such a hard line on honesty with it." Id. 
80. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104(a), 76 Stat. 780, 784 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 355(a) (2000)); see also id. § 102(a)(1) (adding the 
words "the effectiveness" to the definition of "new drug"). 
81. See id. § 104(b). 
82. See id. § 102(b). 
83. See id. § 102(c). 
84. [d. 
85. Id. (emphasis added). 
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reason for refusal: the Secretary could refuse to approve an NDA if, 
"based on a fair evaluation of all material facts, such labeling is 
false or misleading in any particular ...."86 Under the FDCA as 
enacted in 1938, a drug was deemed misbranded if the labeling was 
false or misleading, thus allowing regulation of the content of label­
ing via an enforcement action.87 The 1962 amendments allowed 
regulation of the content of labeling as part of the pre-market ap­
proval process. Thus, the agency's authority was enhanced both by 
timing and its ability to control but not as a matter of the scope of 
authority.88 The scope of authority remained limited; the require­
ment is one of truthfulness-to serve the purpose of educating pre­
scribing physicians as the manufacturers had claimed that they did 
during the congressional hearings.89 
In addition, the 1962 amendments added duties relating to the 
information flowing from a drug's manufacturer to prescribing phy­
sicians. First, a new prohibition was added: the failure of a manu­
facturer to provide to any practitioner authorized to prescribe a 
particular prescription drug, who made a written request for infor­
mation, "true and correct copies of all printed matter which is re­
quired to be included in any package in which that drug is 
distributed or sold, or such other printed matter as is approved by 
the Secretary."90 Second, a prescription drug could be deemed mis­
branded if its advertisements or printed matter-other than label­
ing-failed to include a "true statement" of the drug's established 
name, its formula and ingredients, and "such other information in 
brief summary relating to side effects, contraindications, and effec­
86. Id. The amendments also made clear that the Secretary's authority in assess­
ing for safety, effectiveness, and false and misleading labels extended beyond the pre­
market approval process by virtue of the ability to "withdraw approval of an applica­
tion." See id. § 102(d). In addition, the amendments gave the Secretary the authority 
to require by general regulation or by order with respect to a particular approved 
NDA-if found necessary-records or reports that would help the agency to make 
post-approval assessments. See id. § 103(a). 
87. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 502, 
52 Stat. 1040, 1050 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 352 (2000)). 
88. The amendments similarly bolstered the agency's post-approval powers, and 
power over drugs already on the market, by authorizing the Secretary to "withdraw" 
approval of a drug if its labeling is false or misleading and not corrected within a rea­
sonable time of being notified of the perceived deficiency. See § 102(d). 
89. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Legal Status of Approved Labeling for 
Prescription Drugs, Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Adminis­
tration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug. 15, 1972) (explaining that, under the regula­
tory scheme in place at that time, the FDA was charged with the responsibility of 
judging the truthfulness of prescription drug labeling). 
90. See Drug Amendments § 114(a). 
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tiveness as shall be required in regulations which shall be issued by 
the Secretary ...."91 Evidenced by its omission of labeling from 
the "true statement" requirement, Congress expressly did not dele­
gate to the agency any additional authority over labeling. 
Regarding labeling, section 502(g) of the FDCA was amended 
in some respects, but the amendments did not delete or repeal the 
clause in section 502(g) regarding the requirement of satisfying the 
standards for packaging and labeling established by the USP.92 
Again, it seems that Congress implicitly limited the scope of the 
agency's authority as to the content of labeling of prescription 
drugs. 
3. Limited Specific Directives Imposed by Congress 
The foregoing review of the statutory scheme relating to pre­
scription drug labeling was necessary to help assess the source of 
the intent to preempt. Because the FDA has asserted conflict pre­
emption-and that variant of conflict preemption that parallels 
field preemption-an important factor in the totality of circum­
stances analysis is the extent to which the agency activity that pur­
portedly warrants preemption has actually been devised by 
Congress. Over time, Congress empowered the FDA to make as­
sessments relating to drugs, both at the pre-marketing and post­
marketing stages. Those assessments are tied to specific standards 
set by Congress: drugs may not be misbranded and their labels may 
not be false and misleading, and the drugs themselves must be 
found to be safe and effective under the conditions prescribed, rec­
ommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling.93 Further, Con­
gress provided some guidance regarding these standards, spelling 
out several specific ways in which drugs could be misbranded, in­
cluding a failure to provide adequate directions and warnings.94 
Through the enactment of the Humphrey-Durham Amend­
ments, Congress signaled its intent that a class of drugs known as 
91. See id. § 131(a). 
92. See id. § 112(b). On the other hand, a provision of the "new" prohibition 
noted in the last paragraph states that "[n]othing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
exempt any person from any labeling requirement imposed by or under other provi­
sions of this Act." Id. § 114(a). This provision references and shows congressional rec­
ognition of agency authority over content of labeling. However, because the agency 
had not yet regulated extensively, any congressional recognition of agency control 
would also necessarily be limited. 
93. See supra Part II. A.1. 
94. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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prescription drugs could be treated differently.95 The HDAs also 
made clear that the decision regarding which drugs should fall 
within that class is not solely a matter for the agency to address via 
rulemaking.96 When properly dispensed, prescription drugs are ex­
empt from section S02(f); and before being dispensed, their labels 
must bear the requisite "cautionary legend."97 
Thus, the agency activity triggering preemption-the approval 
determination-is, at least in part, activity taken in accordance with 
a scheme devised by Congress. However, Congress only provided 
limited guidance and the analysis, therefore, must go deeper. The 
question becomes whether, in making those assessments, the 
agency is guided primarily by the statutory terms themselves, or by 
more refined or new standards put in place by the agency. The 
analysis must include a careful review of the regulatory scheme put 
in place by the agency, and a consideration of the interplay between 
the statutory provisions-in particular the HDAs-and the 
regulations. 
B. 	 The Evolution of the Agency's ReguLation of Prescription 
Drug Labeling 
The following analysis focuses on both the extent to which the 
agency, in implementing the regulatory scheme, went beyond the 
directives set by Congress, as well as issues relating to the agency's 
authority. 
1. 	 Stage One: Minimal Regulation That Laid the 

Foundation 

Agency regulation of drug labeling promptly followed enact­
ment of the FDCA in December of 1938.98 In support of the regu­
lations, the agency expressly pointed to section 701 (a) of the FDCA 
and, notably, the 1938 regulations largely reflected an understand­
ing that the agency's powers were enforcement powers.99 Consis­
95. Humphrey-Durham Amendments, ch. 578, § 1, 65 Stat. 648, 648-49 (1951) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 353 (2000)). 
96. 	 Id. 
97. 	 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
98. Promulgation of Regulations Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act and Repeal of Certain Regulations Heretofore Promulgated Thereunder, 3 Fed. 
Reg. 3161, 3161 (Dec. 28, 1938). 
99. Id. The agency action was simply titled "Promulgation of Regulations Under 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and Repeal of Certain Regulations Hereto­
fore Promulgated Thereunder." Id. The regulations were prefaced by a note stating 
that "[t]he caption of each of the following regulations designates the section of the Act 
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tent with an exercise of enforcement power, the regulations dealing 
with drug labels were interpretive or promulgated pursuant to a 
power to create "exemptions." 
For example, interpretive regulations included regulations clar­
ifying the definition of "labeling," and specifying that various types 
of statements or omissions of types of statements would constitute 
"misbranding" or render a label "misleading."Ioo The regulations 
also specified what would be required to ensure compliance with 
section 502(b), which requires a drug's label to include an "accurate 
statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, mea­
sure, or numerical count," and with section 502( e), which requires a 
drug's label to include the names of active ingredients. lOi The 
agency promulgated exemptions from these requirements as au­
thorized by sections 502(b) and (e).102 
In a similar fashion, the agency promulgated regulations clari­
fying when a drug's label complied with section 502(f)'s require­
ment of adequate directions for use and creating exemptions from 
that requirement.103 The regulations provided that direction could 
be inadequate if they omitted "directions for use in all conditions 
for which such drug ... is prescribed, recommended, or suggested 
in its labeling," and by omissions of information relating to "quan­
tity of dose ... frequency of administration ... duration of adminis­
tration . . . time of administration . . . route or method of 
administration ... or ... preparation for use. "104 
under which the regulation is issued." Id. The agency thus understood the regulations 
to be necessary for the "enforcement" of several specific sections of the FDCA. To that 
end, the agency viewed the regulations to have a dual source of authority: section 701 
and a specific subsection within the FDCA. Id. 
100. /d. at 3161, 3163, 3165. 
101. Id. at 3165-67. 
102. Id. at 3166-67. 
103. Id. at 3167-68. 
104. [d. By way of regulations such as these, the agency was, in a sense, creating 
duties. From an administrative law perspective, however, the regulations readily can be 
characterized as interpretive. For example, in regard to the regulations requiring direc­
tions to include certain types of information, the duty was created by Congress's deci­
sion that a drug is misbranded unless it includes adequate directions for use. Id. at 
3167. In enforcing the FDCA, the agency must decide whether the directions on a 
drug's label are "adequate." Id. As a matter of efficient enforcement, it becomes rea­
sonable to interpret what type of information should be included to satisfy Congress's 
requirement and to set forth that interpretation by way of regulation. The first part of 
the regulation clarified that "directions for use" are necessary for each use included on 
the drug's label. Id. As to the second part, it is reasonable to characterize information 
regarding preparation and dosage, and information regarding timing, duration, and 
method of administration, as relating to how to use the drug. Id. at 3168. Thus, al­
though the agency has been more specific than Congress about what type of informa­
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The agency also created three exemptions from section 502(f)'s 
requirement of adequate directions for use.1°5 Specifically, the 
agency exempted three categories of drugs: (1) drugs for which "ad­
equate directions for [use] are known by the ordinary individual"; 
(2) drugs whose shipment or delivery was limited solely to physi­
cians [and] dentists, and for which the label bore a statement cau­
tioning that it be used only by prescription and containing medical 
terms only if they likely would not "be understood by the ordinary 
individual" (the "cautionary legend"); and (3) drugs appropriately 
limited to manufacturing use only.106 
The agency's use of its 502(f) exemption power is of central 
importance given the focus of this Article on the agency's authority 
over prescription drug labeling.Jo7 As a distinct delegation of 
rule making authority, the exemption power is not limited to en­
forcement and thus regulations can go beyond mere interpretive 
regulations, or regulations of process or procedure. Nonetheless, 
authority to promulgate 502(f) exemptions was expressly limited by 
Congress. Congress empowered the agency to exempt drugs from 
the duty where "adequate directions for use" are "not necessary for 
the protection of the public health."108 The 1938 regulations argua­
bly fall within this limitation.109 Drugs limited to use for manufac­
turing purposes will not reach individuals who consume the drugs. 
As to drugs that could reach individuals, directions arguably are not 
necessary where "adequate directions" are commonly known, or 
where an individual will know that directions should be provided by 
a prescribing physician or dentist. Additionally, the exemptions 
constituted mere exemptions and imposed no duties. Thus, the ex­
emptions, as created in 1938, were consistent with the agency's au­
tion must be included on a drug's label, the regulations readily conform to the scope of 
the duty set forth in the text of the statute. 
105. Id. at 3168. The agency also created exemptions under section 503(a) and 
exemptions from section 505 for investigational drugs. 
106. Id. 
107. See infra Part III. 
108. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 
§ 502(f), 52 Stat. 1040, 1051 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 353 (2000». 
109. See id. The proviso states: "That where any requirement of clause (1) of this 
paragraph, as applied to any drug or device, is not necessary for the protection of the 
public health, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations exempting such drug or device 
from such requirement." It is important to note that section 503(b)'s authorization of 
the Secretary to exempt from certain labeling requirements drugs dispensed on a writ­
ten prescription would not have allowed this action by the Secretary. See id. The ex­
emptions permitted via section 503 did not include the requirement of section 502(f). 
See id. § 503(b). 
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thority as delimited in the FDCA. In short order, however, the 
agency amended the section S02(f) exemptions and, via the exemp­
tion power, began down the path of more comprehensive regulation 
of the content of the labeling of prescription drugs. 
In 1941, the agency amended the regulations exempting drugs 
from section 502(f)'s requirement of adequate directions for use. lIO 
The agency again pointed to section 701(a) and section 502(f) for 
the source of the authority for the regulations.111 The same three 
categories of drugs were exempted-prescription drugs, drugs in­
tended for manufacturing only, and drugs for which adequate direc­
tions are commonly known. However, the agency imposed 
additional conditions on the exemption for prescription drugS.112 
Specifically, the 1941 regulations provided an exemption for a ship­
ment or delivery of drugs intended for use only by prescription only 
if "adequate directions for so using such drug ... are available in 
scientific publications or otherwise" and, in addition, only if "in the 
case of a drug that is not designated solely by a name recognized in 
an official compendium and that is fabricated from two or more 
ingredients, its label also bears the quantity or proportion of each 
active ingredient. "113 
The regulations thus conditioned the exemption on additional 
requirements,114 which raises the question whether the agency had 
the authority to begin imposing such requirements. In promulgat­
ing the 1941 regulations, the agency pointed to section 502(f) for 
the source of its authority.ns The question then is whether a dele­
gation of rule making authority to create exemptions from a duty 
110. Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, 6 Fed. Reg. 1920, 1920 (Apr. 15, 1941). 
111. See id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1920-21. The regulation further specified that if any shipment or deliv­
ery of drugs intended for prescription use was disposed of "otherwise," the exemption 
would expire and the person causing the exemption to expire would be liable for mis­
branding unless the drugs were relabeled to comply with section 502(f). Id. at 1920. 
114. If the idea underlying the exemption is that prescription drugs do not need 
"adequate directions for use" because directions will be provided by the prescribing 
doctor, it makes sense that the prescribing doctors have access to information necessary 
to provide directions to patients. Further, because doctors often get their information 
about drugs from an official compendium, a list of active ingredients-which would 
enable doctors to use a compendium-would be useful information for prescribing 
doctors. 
115. /d. at 1920 (stating: "Under the authority and pursuant to sections 502(f) ... 
Paragraphs (b) and (c) of the regulation under section 502(f) of the Act are changed to 
read as follows ...."). 
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imposed by Congress includes a delegation of authority to impose 
requirements to obtain the exemption.l16 
In 1944, the section 502(f) exemption regulations were 
amended yet again, adding layers of complexity to the exemption 
scheme and raising additional questions concerning the agency's au­
thority relating to labeling for prescription drugs.117 Again, the 
agency pointed to sections 502(f) and 701(a) of the FDCA as the 
dual source of the authority for the amendments to the exemp­
tions.118 One controversial aspect of the amendments was the 
agency's decision to limit use of the "prescription only" designation. 
The regulations were amended to prescribe that a shipment of 
drugs would be exempted from § 502(f)(1) only if the "drug .. . 
because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect ... is 
not generally recognized among experts ... as safe and efficacious 
for use except by or under the supervision of a physician ...."119 
This agency action was a key spur for the 1951 statutory 
amendments.120 
In addition, the regulations added important clarifications,121 
and prior requirements were changed or new requirements imposed 
relating to access to the exemption. The exemption now hinged on 
having information "adequate for use ... readily available,"122 
which was a relaxing of the 1941 requirement, and having a label 
bearing a statement as to the quantity of each active ingredient and 
the "cautionary legend,"123 which was the same as the 1941 require­
116. This becomes a recurring issue in the history of the FDA's regulation of pre­
scription drug labeling. See, e.g., infra notes 121-126, and 156 and accompanying text. 
117. See Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos­
metic Act, 9 Fed. Reg. 12,255 (Oct. 10, 1944). 
118. See id. at 12,255 ("By virtue of and pursuant to the provisions of sections 
502(f) and 701(a) ... the regulations heretofore promulgated under sections 502(f) and 
505 of the act are hereby amended .... The regulation promulgated under section 
502(f) of the act (21 c.F.R., Cum. Supp., 2.106) is amended by striking out paragraphs 
(b) and (c) and substituting therefor the following paragraphs (b) to (k), inclusive 
...."). 
119. Id.; see also Interview with William W. Goodrich, supra note 78 (noting that 
in 1942, Crawford "devised the idea of amending the regulations to limit to prescription 
drugs all those drugs that could not be sold safely without prescription, and to require 
all those that could have adequate directions for use to have adequate directions"). 
120. See infra section n.B.2. 
121. For example, the regulations clarified that the exemption required that the 
drugs be dispensed by physicians or dentists engaged in-and upon prescriptions issued 
in-professional practice; and that the labeling bear directions for use specified in such 
prescriptions. Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos­
metic Act, 9 Fed. Reg. at 12,255. 
122. Id. at 12,256. 
123. Id. 
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ment. Additionally, however, the exemption now required the la­
bel to include the information concerning the drug's use that had 
been in the proposed labeling submitted in the application pro­
cess.124 As with the earlier regulations, the exemption was condi­
tioned on additional requirements. In the text of the statute, 
Congress required "adequate directions for use."125 The agency ex­
empted prescription drugs from that requirement only upon meet­
ing a labeling requirement that could potentially be more 
comprehensive than that required by Congress.126 
Whether the requirement actually was more comprehensive re­
quires consideration of the 1944 regulations pertaining to the new 
drug application process. Pointing to its authority over the market 
approval process, the agency by regulation required applications 
"to include a statement showing whether the drug is to be exempt" 
from section S02(f), and, if so, provided that the application may be 
found 
insufficien t if: 
(1) The specimen label of the drug fails to incorporate by 
reference a specifically identified brochure or other printed mat­
ter containing information adequate for the use of such drug by 
physicians [and] dentists ... ; [ or] 
(2) Such label fails to state that the drug is to be used as 
shown in such brochure ... ; [or] 
(3) The application fails to contain copies of such brochure 
... ; or 
(4) The application fails to show that such brochure ... is 
readily available to physicians ....127 
The new application requirement, then, was essentially to pre­
pare a "brochure" that contained information "adequate" for the 
use of the drug, and to use the label to inform doctors of the exis­
tence of and the availability of the brochure.128 The corresponding 
new requirement for the exemption thus went beyond the 1941 re­
quirement that a drug manufacturer make available to the prescrib­
124. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 2.106(h) (1944)). 
125. 21 V.S.c. § 352(4)(f) (2000). 
126. Moreover, the agency used the exemption to bolster its regulation of drug 
advertising. The 1944 regulations provided that no exemption would be available for a 
drug "if its advertising contained a representation ... not borne by its labeling and 
which, if so borne, would make it a new drug." Regulations for the Enforcement of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 9 Fed. Reg. at 12,256. 
127. ld. at 12,256-57. 
128. See Interview with William W. Goodrich, supra note 78 
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ing doctor, through other means, "adequate directions." The 1944 
regulations specified the "other means" that could be used. The 
regulatory scheme thus gave rise to two distinct issues: whether the 
agency had the authority to require a brochure as part of the appli­
cation process, and the recurring issue of whether the authority to 
create exemptions from Congress's labeling requirement included 
the authority to impose additional labeling requirements on drug 
manufacturers. The recurring issue of whether the exemption au­
thority includes authority to impose additional requirements is a 
thornier issue.129 The agency's actions raised concerns that were 
frequently expressed in the hearings on the 1950 statutory amend­
ments, but that were not addressed by a court until after the agency 
expanded its requirements in what this Article refers to as Stage 
Two of the evolution of the agency's regulation. 
Thus, during the first stage of agency regulation of drug label­
ing, the FDA distinguished between prescription and non-prescrip­
tion drugs. While it required "adequate directions" for both, it 
regulated what constitutes "adequate directions" for prescription 
drugs by way of the interplay between two sources: its authority 
over the application process and its authority to exempt drugs from 
Congress's labeling requirement. Notably, the agency did not in 
Stage One regulate the content of "information for use"-leaving 
that as a matter between the manufacturer and prescribing physi­
cians. Although the agency's regulation of content during this stage 
was minimal, the agency activity laid the foundation for more rigor­
ous regulation of prescription drug labeling. 
129. Regarding the brochure, agency rulemaking authority relating to the appli­
cation process remains subject to the delegation of rulemaking authority in section 
701(a). The basic findings that the agency is authorized to make during the application 
process are that (based on the information before the agency) (1) the drug is safe for 
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed label­
ing, and (2) the labeling is not false or misleading. See supra notes 52-56 and accompa­
nying text. The agency thus would have authority to clarify, via interpretive regulations, 
what Congress intended to ban by the proscription on false and misleading labeling, or 
what standards the agency would use to determine whether a drug is safe. Additionally, 
the agency would have authority to issue rules of process and procedure, such as rules 
that would enhance the agency's ability to evaluate drug labeling or to fully compre­
hend the substance of the proposed labeling. Requiring that directions for use for pre­
scription drugs be incorporated into a brochure or other printed matter arguably could 
enhance the agency's ability to evaluate the labeling and arguably relates to safety since 
the requirement serves as a way of making it more likely that the manufacturer has 
pertinent information for safe use readily available for prescribing providers. As a re­
quirement of format only, the regulation arguably did not raise concerns about over­
stepping of the agency's authority. 
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2. Responses to Stage One of the Agency's Regulations 
In the FDCA, as enacted in 1938, Congress did not differenti­
ate between prescription drugs and drugs that could be dispensed 
without a prescription. Yet, as explained, the agency made a dis­
tinction via regulations. The Stage One regulations left the decision 
regarding which drugs would be prescription to the drug manufac­
turers and required adequate directions for use only if the drug was 
dispensed over-the-counter. The 1944 regulations limited the ex­
emption-and thus prescription drugs-to drugs that could not be 
sold safely without prescription by a licensed health care provider 
and created distinct labeling requirements for prescription drugs.13o 
Although never codified, the agency also later limited the pharma­
cist's ability to refill prescriptions.131 Understandably, the agency's 
approach to prescription drugs and their labeling raised concerns, 
and those concerns led to the enactment of the 1951 amendments to 
the FDCA-the Humphrey-Durham amendments. 
During the extensive hearings on the HDAs, drug manufactur­
ers raised concerns relating to the agency's authority to regulate 
prescription drugs differently than other drugs. In particular, it was 
noted that the agency had left the decision about which drugs 
should be considered prescription drugs to the manufacturer be­
cause "the act conferred no authority upon the Food and Drug Ad­
ministration to create classes of drugs or to specify the manner in 
which drugs of each class should be labeled and sold."132 Further, 
regarding the agency's view that the statute itself "classifies drugs," 
it was noted that: 
Surely, if this be the proper interpretation of the act, no one 
should be more surprised than Congress. The battle for the en­
130. See Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos­
metic Act, 9 Fed. Reg. 12,255. 
131. In October 1948, the agency decided that no prescription written by a medi­
cal practitioner that had once been filled was refillable by the pharmacist. This new ban 
was not codified. Rather, the agency announced the new ban as an interpretation of the 
law in a speech to the National Association of Retail Druggists. Later, in a drug jour­
nal, the Commissioner stated that a physician's prescription is like a check on a bank: 
"Once it has been 'cashed,' it cannot be 'cashed' again." See A Bill to Amend Section 
503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Hearing on H.R. 3298 Before the 
H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Congo 121 (1951), reprinted in 11 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITs 
AMENDMENTS 147 (1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (hearings related to the 
Humphrey-Durham amendments). Whether to permit prescription refills, and, if so, 
how, were key issues at the time of the HDAs. 
132. Walton M. Wheeler, Jr., Prescription Refills, 5 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 746, 
751 (1950). 
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actment of the act is portrayed in volumes of committee hearings, 
committee reports, and congressional debates, and in countless 
early drafts of the act. All of this material seems to support the 
conclusion that Congress assumed and intended that a drug con­
sumer would receive adequate protection if the label told him 
what he was taking, how to take it, and when to stop ....133 
Accordingly, there is little to support the view that anything 
in the act or in its legislative history requires drugs to be divided 
into two classes ... .134 
The agency itself acknowledged the ambiguity regarding its au­
thority to regulate prescription drugs as a class. In his prepared 
statement on the HDAs, made to the House Committee on Inter­
state and Foreign Commerce, the administrator of the Federal Se­
curity Agency explained the operation of the existing regulatory 
scheme, noting in particular its practical effect of limiting "a num­
ber of drugs to the prescription departments of retail pharma­
cies,"135 and the potential difficulty encountered by pharmacists 
when manufacturers labeled a drug as prescription when it was not 
clear that the drug could not be dispensed safely without a prescrip­
tion.136 The administrator acknowledged that "[t]he present statute 
does not in so many words authorize us either to differentiate be­
tween 'prescription drugs' on one hand, and 'over-the-counter 
drugs' on the other."137 He nonetheless asserted, "[w]hile some law­
133. Id. at 752. Additionally, 

[t]his is borne out by the oft-repeated quotation from the report of the Senate 

committee on S. 5: 

"The bill is not intended to restrict in any way the availability of drugs for 
self-medication. On the contrary, it is intended to make self-medication safer 
and more effective. For this purpose provisions are included ... requiring that 
labels bear adequate directions for use and warnings against probable 
misuse...." 
Id. (omissions in original). 
134. Id. (concluding that "the present regulation, which ... requires the use of the 
prescription legend on drugs that may be used safely and effectively only under medical 
supervision is of questionable validity"). 
135. A Bill to Amend Section 503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 
Hearing on H.R. 3298 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Comm. H.R., 82d 
Congo 19 (1951) (statement of Hon. Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator, Federal Security 
Agency), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 131, at 47. 
136. Id. (explaining that when a drug is delivered to a pharmacist (or druggist) 
from a manufacturer with the cautionary label, and the pharmacist sells the drug with­
out a prescription but with "labeling giving adequate directions for use," the agency 
considered the drug to be misbranded under 502(a) because of the false implication that 
the drug could be used safely by a layperson). 
137. Id. 
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yers have disagreed, ... authority for our present regulation and for 
its proposed revision is found in the present statute-though it is 
contained in one four-line proviso."l3S 
Congress enacted the HDAs but did not delegate to the agency 
the full extent of authority that the agency sought. A primary con­
cern of the agency, manufacturers, and pharmacists was the method 
used to identify which drugs should be deemed prescription drugs 
and thus subject to the requirements established by Congress in sec­
tion 503(b) via the HDAs. Under the Stage One regulatory 
scheme, the agency had established a standard, but it left the initial 
decision as to whether a drug satisfied that standard to the manu­
facturer. l39 If the agency disagreed with the manufacturer's assess­
ment, enforcement had to be pursued via a criminal prosecution, an 
action for seizure, or an injunction.140 Due to inefficiencies in that 
approach, the agency sought a statutory definition of prescription 
drugs that included drugs "found by the Administrator, after inves­
tigation and opportunity for public hearing, to be unsafe or ineffec­
tive for use without . . . professional diagnosis or supervision 
...."141 That approach proved to be controversial and eventually 
was eliminated. The HDAs, as enacted, did not authorize the FDA 
to develop administratively a list of prescription drugS.142 
Nonetheless, the HDAs otherwise largely codified the scheme 
that had been put in place by the agency.143 As explained, the 1951 
statutory amendments required that drugs that could not be used 
safely except under appropriate medical supervision be dispensed 
only upon a proper prescription; and they expressly exempted from 
the requirements of section 502(f) any drug dispensed by prescrip­
tion.144 This exemption was not limited to the first clause of section 
502(f), and thus Congress exempted prescription drugs from the re­
quirements of both "adequate directions for use" and "adequate 
138. Id. at 44. Ewing noted: "I think we ought to have clear and unequivocal 
authority. The bill before you would confer such authority ...." Id. at 47. 
139. See H.R. REP. No. 82-700, at 4 (1951), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY, supra note 131, at 278. 
140. Id. 
141. H.R. 3298, 82nd Congo (1951) (enacted), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY, supra note 131, at 15. 
142. H.R. REP. No. 82-946, at 2-3 (1951), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 131, at 665-66. 
143. See generally Humphrey-Durham Amendments, ch. 578, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 333, 353 (2000». 
144. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
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warnings against use."14S This exemption, however, was aimed at 
prescription drugs upon being dispensed. The term "dispensed" 
was understood to refer to a retail sale by a druggist under the su­
pervision of a registered pharmacist.146 
A key question relating to agency authority, then, is how the 
HDAs may have affected the agency's authority over the labeling of 
prescription drugs before the time of being dispensed. If section 
502(f) continued to apply to prescription drugs up to the time of 
being dispensed, the agency's authority to exempt drugs from the 
requirement of "adequate directions for use" would remain as a ve­
hicle for agency regulation of prescription drug labeling. As the 
next stage of agency regulation makes clear, the agency viewed the 
HDAs as a green light for continued regulation of the content of 
prescription drug labeling. 
3. 	 Stage Two: Transforming the Agency into a Demanding 
Regulator 
During the second stage of FDA activity in relation to prescrip­
tion drug labeling, the agency built upon the foundation set during 
Stage One and asserted itself through a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme. During the 1960s and 1970s, the agency greatly expanded 
its regulation of the content of prescription drug labeling and 
shifted away from a mere enforcement approach to regulation. At 
145. See Humphrey-Durham Amendments § 1. The provision stated: "Any drug 
dispensed by filling or refilling a written or oral prescription ... shall be exempt from 
the requirements of section [502(f)] ...." Id. 
146. A Bill to Amend Section 503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 
Hearing on H.R. 3298 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Comm. H.R., 82d 
Congo 76 (1951) (statement of Charley Wesley Dunn, General Counsel, American Phar­
maceutical Manufacturers' Association), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 131, at 102. It is only at the point of being dispensed that prescription drugs reach 
the hands of consumers. The rationale was, at that point, that the directions needed by 
the consumer were simply the specific directions provided by the prescribing health 
care provider. H.R. REP. No. 82-700, at 16 (1951), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY, supra note 131, at 290. Congress codified two requirements for the exemption. 
First, a dispensed prescription drug was exempt if its label contained information about 
the dispenser and the prescriber of the drug, and, "if stated in the prescription, the 
name of the patient, and the directions for use and cautionary statements, if any, con­
tained in such prescription." Humphrey-Durham Amendments § 1. This requirement 
was new and different from any imposed previously by regulation. Second, Congress 
codified the agency requirement that the label include the "cautionary legend"­
namely, that it only be used with a prescription. Id. Congress also provided that 
"[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to relieve any person from any require­
ment prescribed by or under authority of law with respect to drugs now included or 
which may hereafter be included" in federal laws dealing with narcotics or marijuana. 
Id. 
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the same time, the source of the agency's authority shifted. Nota­
bly, in the 1960 regulations the agency expressly pointed only to 
section 701(a) of the FDCA as the source of its authority.147 Yet, 
the agency regulations being amended were the "exemption regula­
tions." The agency stated in the introductory sentence to the 
amended subsection (b): "A drug subject to the requirements of 
section 503(b)(1) of the act," as newly amended by the HDAs, 
"shall be exempt from section 502(f)(1) if all the following condi­
tions are met ...."148 The agency was clearly acting pursuant to its 
exemption authority. 
The 1960 regulations added several requirements relating to 
the content of prescription drug labeling. In addition to the "cau­
tionary statement" required by Congress in the HDAs,149 the 
agency required the label of the drug to include information about 
dosage, route of administration, active and inactive ingredients, and 
the identifying lot or control number. It further required "any la­
beling" to contain 
[a]dequate information for such use, including indications, effects 
... and any relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and 
precautions, under which practitioners licensed by law to admin­
ister the drug can use the drug safely and for the purposes for 
which it is intended, including all conditions for which it is adver­
tised or represented; and if the article is subject to section 505, 
506, or 507 of the act [the market application process] ... the 
labeling providing such information is substantially the same as 
the labeling authorized by the effective new-drug application 
150 
Thus, pursuant to its power to exempt drugs from Congress's re­
quirement, the agency began to regulate the content of prescription 
drug labels and labeling much more extensively in its 1960 
regulations. lSI 
147. See Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos­
metic Act-Changes in Drug-Labeling Requirement, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,592, 12,592 (Dec. 
9,1960). 
148. Id. at 12,593. 
149. Humphrey-Durham Amendments § 1. Congress required the label on pre­
scription drugs to include the statement, "Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing 
without prescription." [d. 
150. Changes in Drug-Labeling Requirement, 25 Fed. Reg. at 12,593. 
151. See Interview with William W. Goodrich, supra note 78 (noting that the 
agency had never really insisted that the brochure be used by manufacturers, and ex­
plaining that the 1960 regulations represented the first real step by the agency in requir­
ing full disclosure in promotional materials such as the Physician's Desk Reference). 
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The 1960 regulations also amended the application process. 
Specifically, the amendments to the application process provided 
that labeling for prescription drugs "should bear information for 
use under which practitioners can use the drug for the purposes for 
which it is intended, including all the purposes for which it is to be 
advertised or represented."152 Further, the label "will also contain 
substantially the same information for its use, including indications, 
effects, dosages, routes, methods, and frequency and duration of 
administration, any relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects, 
and precautions, contained in the labeling which is part of this ap­
plication."153 The regulations also provided that representations re­
garding labeling made during the application process would "apply 
to the drug produced until an effective supplement to the applica­
tion provides for a change,"154 and revised the process for supple­
mental applications.155 
As with the Stage One regulations, the additional requirements 
are defensible on one hand, in that the regulations seek to ensure 
that the manufacturer provides to the prescribing physician infor­
mation relevant and material to the decision whether to prescribe. 
Indeed, the agency noted that the purpose of the amendments was 
to require "manufacturers to furnish adequate information for the 
professional use of prescription drugs."156 On the other hand, it is 
the agency that made the decision to regulate the content of pre­
scription drug labeling and that began putting in place significant 
requirements. Additionally, the issues relating to authority remain: 
to what extent does the authority to grant an exemption from a 
requirement for "adequate directions for use" include an authoriza­
tion to impose new and different labeling obligations? And was 
that authority in any way limited by the HDA?157 
152. Changes in Drug-Labeling Requirement, 25 Fed. Reg. at 12,594. 
153. ld. 
154. !d. 
155. ld. at 12,595. 
156. ld. at 12,593. 
157. As a result of the precise text used by the agency, a key difference exists 
between the Stage One and Stage Two regulatory schemes. As noted, in the 1944 regu­
lations, the additional duty of the brochure requirement was imposed via the agency's 
authority over the application process and was then merely incorporated into the ex­
emption scheme. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text. The 1960 regula­
tions operate in reverse. The additional duty is imposed as a requirement for the 
exemption, and then incorporated into the application process. The regulations per­
taining to the application process make clear that applications involving prescription 
drugs will include labeling-as required by the exemption provision. In addition, it is 
the exemption regulations that direct that, once approved, the labeling must substan­
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The next major amendments to the pres·cription drug labeling 
regulations were promulgated in 1979, after, and in part in response 
to, the 1962 statutory amendments. As explained, however, the 
1962 statutory amendments did not significantly affect the agency's 
authority over the labeling of prescription drugs. The key changes 
to the statute in the 1962 amendments related to the application 
process. Pre-market "approval" was necessary; and approval 
hinged on agency assessment of not only safety, but also effective­
ness.15S Additionally, the Secretary could refuse approval if the 
drug labeling was found to be "false or misleading."159 
Nonetheless, the 1979 regulations constituted a substantial ex­
pansion of the agency's regulation of the content of prescription 
drug labeling. Consuming five pages of the Federal Register, the 
regulations described in much greater detail the precise content and 
format that, in the agency's view, is necessary for physicians to 
safely and effectively prescribe the drug. Overall, the regulations 
required labeling to summarize the necessary information for safe 
and effective use.160 More particularly, the regulations specified in 
detail the precise format and kind of information that manufactur­
ers had to include in the labeling. The regulations directed that all 
prescription drug labeling must include the following section head­
ings: description; clinical pharmacology; indications and usage; con­
traindications; warnings; precautions; adverse reactions; drug abuse 
and dependence; overdosage; dosage and administration; and how 
supplied.161 The regulations also specified the order of the head­
ings and which type of information had to be included within each 
section.162 For example, under the heading "warnings," the labeling 
was required to 
describe serious adverse reactions and potential safety hazards, 
limitations in use imposed by them, and steps that should be 
taken if they occur. The labeling shall be revised to include a 
warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association 
tially conform to the labeling presented to the FDA at the time of the approval. See 
supra notes 150 and 153 and accompanying text. This difference has significance to the 
extent that the HDAs cast some doubt on the agency's authority to regulate labeling via 
the exemption proviso. 
158. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra note 86 and accompanying text 
160. Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Label­
ing for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434,37,462 (June 26, 1979) (codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201 & 202). 
161. ld. 
162. Id. at 37,462-66. 
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of a serious hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not 
have been proved .... Special problems, particularly those that 
may lead to death or serious injury, may be required by the Food 
and Drug Administration to be placed in a prominently displayed 
box .... If a boxed warning is required, its location will be speci­
fied by the Food and Drug Administration.163 
The agency's view of the source of its authority for the regula­
tions is found in a statement in the preamble to the rules. The 
agency stated: 
Section S02(f)(1) of the act requires that a drug's labeling bear 
adequate directions for use. For a prescription drug to be exempt 
from section S02(f)(1) of the act, § 201.100(d) ... requires that 
the labeling for the drug contain adequate information for the 
drug's safe and effective use. In addition, labeling of a drug may 
be misleading under § 1.21(a) if it fails to reveal facts that are 
material in light of other representations made or suggested by 
statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, or 
material with respect to consequences that may result from use of 
the drug under the conditions prescribed in the labeling or the 
conditions of use that are customary or usual,164 
The agency explained its intent in several different ways. It 
stated that the new formatting and content requirements were 
intended to provide physicians with a clear and concise statement 
of the data and information necessary for the safe and effective 
use of the drug. . . . 
· .. [T]o provide the essential information the practitioner 
needs to use a drug safely and effectively in the care of 
patients.... 
· .. [T]o provide a uniform standard for the kinds of data and 
information necessary to enable physicians to use drugs safely 
and effectively .... 
· . . [T]o improve prescription drug labeling to the point 
where a compendium can be developed .... 
163. Id. at 37,463. 
164. Id. at 37,436. 
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... [T]o provide standards so that all prescription drug label­
ing can be brought up to the level of the best labeling written in 
the past.165 
The FDA also noted that "[t]he efficient enforcement of the act by 
FDA requires that the regulated industry be apprised of the criteria 
under which labeling will be in compliance with legal requirements. 
The purpose of these regulations is to provide a more concise state­
ment of those criteria."166 
The 1979 regulations thus reflected a new administrative phi­
losophy. Up until 1970, the agency viewed itself largely as an en­
forcement agency.167 However, Charles Edwards, appointed 
commissioner in 1969, brought a new vision to the FDA.168 Alexan­
der Schmidt, Commissioner from 1973-1976, has explained the ex­
tensive influence of Dr. Edwards. 
Charlie was brought in to move the agency into the twentieth 
century, so to speak .... 

And the question for FDA [was], what business were they in? 

And Charlie asked that question. And the answer was not, we're 

in the business of putting people in jail. The answer to the ques­

tion of what business is the FDA in is, it's a public safety agency. 

It's insuring safe and effective products on the market. It's not 

like the FTC; it's not economic regulation .... 

[T]he question then becomes, what is the most effective, efficient 
way of insuring safe and effective products. And Charlie's an­
swer was ... that there were ways other than sticking people in 
jail. Education, for example. Voluntary compliance with guide­
lines and with standards, for example .... 
Charlie revamped the administration of the agency .... 
The most important thing that happened at FDA while I was 
there was ... the re-write of all of the administrative regulations 
165. Id. at 37,435, 37,437-38. 
166. Id. at 37,439. 
167. See Interview with Alexander M. Schmidt, supra note 66. Schmidt explained 
that while Billy Goodrich was general counsel, from 1939 to 1971, the agency "was a 
cop agency. It was an enforcement agency. It enforced the law, and that was about it." 
Id. 
168. In December 1969, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS» Secretary Robert H. Finch named 
Edwards Commissioner of Food and Drugs. Edwards's tenure at the FDA lasted until 
March 1973. Interestingly, HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan in 1990 named Edwards to 
head an Advisory Committee charged with reviewing the FDA's mission, structure, pri­
orities, staffing, and budget. See Charles Edwards, MD, http://www.fda.gov/ocl 
commissioners/edwards.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
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of the agency, the revamping of the administration and manage­
ment of the agency .... 
. . . [T]he colossal changes of the administrative regulations 
and the re-looking at all of the ways we coerced industry into 
doing what they should dO.169 
It was during Stage Two-the 1960s through the 1970s-that 
the agency elected to expand its regulatory role and to become a 
more demanding regulator of the labeling of prescription drugs. 
The agency's shift in approach, combined with a very real and delib­
erate expansion in terms of agency-imposed requirements and stan­
dards, should be accorded appropriate weight in the analysis of the 
source of the intent to preempt. 
C. 	 The Activity Purportedly Triggering Preemption Was Devised 
Predominantly by the Agency 
Application of a totality of the circumstances analysis to the 
preemption being asserted by the FDA points to the agency as the 
source of the intent to preempt. As explained, a key inquiry in a 
totality of the circumstances analysis is the extent to which the 
agency activity triggering preemption was devised by the agency, as 
opposed to Congress.170 When the purported conflict has resulted 
from a regulatory scheme developed by an agency, courts must as­
sess the extent to which that regulatory scheme has been extended 
beyond any specific directives detailed by Congress in the text of 
the statute. l71 
Here, the agency activity triggering the purported preemption 
is the FDA's approval decision allowing the marketing of a pre­
scription drug. In making that approval decision, the agency is au­
thorized by Congress to assess whether the drug is safe for use 
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
proposed labeling; whether the labeling is false or misleading; and 
whether the drug is misbranded. As noted, Congress has provided 
169. See Interview with Alexander M. Schmidt, supra note 66. Schmidt noted 
that the 1970s were an exciting era because it was a time when the agency essentially 
authorized its own regulations due to the perfunctory executive oversight. 
170. 	 See supra notes 34-35 & 41 and accompanying text. 
171. The Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between regulations that 
merely "parrot the statute" and regulations that reflect a use of the agency's expertise 
and experience. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). Where the 
agency activity reflects a "parroting regulation," it remains reasonable to attribute pre­
emptive intent to Congress. Id. 
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very limited guidance regarding the standards to use in making 
these assessments. l72 Congress directed that a label could be mis­
leading due to both representations and omissions and identified 
several specific instances that could render a drug misbranded, in­
cluding a failure to provide adequate directions and warnings as 
provided in section 502(f).173 Congress specifically exempted pre­
scription drugs from the section 502(f) requirement via the HDAs, 
but only upon being dispensed, and expressly required only a "cau­
tionary statement" on prescription drugs before being dispensed.174 
To the extent that Congress's directive for adequate directions 
and warnings remained applicable to prescription drugs before be­
ing dispensed, the directive as to adequate directions was rendered 
inapplicable to prescription drugs by the agency through the 
agency's exemption authority. In its place, the agency developed 
and imposed many additional requirements and standards relating 
to the labeling for prescription drugs. The agency further defined 
what could render labeling misleading and imposed comprehensive 
requirements and standards that must be satisfied to be exempt 
from section 502(f)(1). 
Regarding the exemption requirements, the agency in Stage 
One required only that "information adequate for use" by prescrib­
ing physicians be made available, eventually in a brochure or other 
type of printed matter.175 It left the issue of what constitutes "ade­
quate information for use" largely as a matter between the drug 
manufacturer and prescribing physicians. In Stage Two, the agency 
made a deliberate move toward more detailed requirements and 
standards. It first required, in 1960, "adequate information," ex­
plicitly, general categories of information. Later, in 1979, it de­
signed a set format, detailing with much greater specificity the type 
of information that must be included if available (five Federal Reg­
ister pages of detail), and establishing standards such as requiring a 
warning once there exists "reasonable scientific evidence of an as­
sociation" between the drug and a serious risk.176 As to the key 
assessment of whether a drug is "safe for use under conditions pre­
scribed, recommended or suggested in proposed labeling," Con­
gress similarly provided no express guidance as to what "conditions 
172. See supra Part II.A.3. 
173. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra notes 160-166 and accompanying text. 
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in the labeling" it was referring to.177 Even if the matter can be 
inferred by reference to the misbranding provision requirements of 
"adequate directions" and "adequate warnings," it is still the 
agency regulations that have given meaning to these phrases. As to 
prescription drugs, the "conditions in the labeling" became the in­
formation required by the exemption regulations.l78 
Moreover, it was the agency that imposed the requirement that 
labeling for prescription drugs (and other drugs) remain "substan­
tially the same" as the labeling presented for the application pro­
cess. In the FDCA and the 1962 amendments, Congress did not 
include any such provision.179 Indeed, even in the 1962 amend­
ments relating to the application and approval process, Congress 
limited the agency's authority over the labeling content to the as­
sessment of whether the labeling was "false and misleading. "180 
The agency went beyond Congress's limited requirements. In 1944, 
the agency conditioned the exemption from 502(f)(1) on a require­
ment that proposed labeling would include information concerning 
"use" submitted in the application process.181 The 1960 regulations 
reiterated that requirement, expressly stating that the new content 
requirements being imposed via the exemption authority must be 
reflected in labeling that is "substantially the same as the labeling 
authorized by the effective new-drug application."182 
Thus, under a totality of the circumstances approach, the con­
tours of the statutory and regulatory schemes strongly suggest that 
the source of the intent to preempt is the agency. Given the signifi­
cant refinements and additions to the regulatory scheme in Stage 
177. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505( d), 
52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 355(d) (2000». 
178. Supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
179. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 102(b )-( d), 505. The 1938 
FDCA did provide that a drug would be misbranded if its "label or labeling" failed to 
conspicuously include any "word, statement, or other information required by or under 
authority of this Act." See id. § 502(c). This requirement, however, is more limited 
than a general requirement that labeling conform to the labeling as it existed at the time 
of the agency's approval of an NDA. It is directed to instances when the FDA may 
have required some specific wording or statement as part of the overall labeling of the 
drug. 
180. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(c)-(d), 76 Stat. 
780, 781-82 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 355(d)-(e» (noting that the agency 
may refuse to approve or withdraw approval if labeling is found to be false and 
misleading). 
181. See Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos­
metic Act, 9 Fed. Reg. 12,255, 12,256 (Oct. 10, 1944) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 2.106(h». 
182. See Changes in Drug-Labeling Requirement, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,592, 12,593 
(Dec. 9, 1960) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1.106); see also id. at 12, 594. 
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Two, the agency activity purportedly triggering preemption has 
been devised predominantly by the agency. The Stage Two FDA 
regulatory scheme goes far beyond mere "parroting regulations."183 
In making the assessments directed by Congress, the agency is 
guided predominantly by the detailed requirements !md standards 
devised by the agency. Indeed, it is fair to say that the labeling 
requirements devised and imposed via the agency's exemption au­
thority were wholly designed by the agency-given that the agency, 
via the exemption, replaced Congress's standards with its own stan­
dards. This part of the totality of the circumstances approach there­
fore readily points to the agency as the source of the intent to 
preempt. I84 
D. 	 The Agency's Shifting View: Important Evidence in the 
Analysis 
A totality of the circumstances approach would also allow 
courts to take into account any other evidence relevant to the ques­
tion of the source of preemption. Evidence of other important cir­
cumstances exists. The history of both the FDA's view and the 
judicial view of the preemption issue provides additional strong evi­
dence that preemption of state failure-to-warn claims should be at­
tributed to agency intent, not congressional intent. For example, in 
the 1979 Final Rule, the FDA clearly expressed its view that label­
ing decisions-at that time-were not considered as establishing 
both a floor and a ceiling and thus should not influence civil tort 
liability.I85 Similarly, until very recently the majority of lower 
183. 	 See supra note 41. 
184. Notably, the rigorous scrutiny required by a totality of the circumstances 
analysis also brings to light considerations important in a traditional preemption analy­
sis, namely, information relevant to congressional intent. Here, nothing in the text of 
the statutory provisions reveals any intent on the part of Congress to require uniformity 
in the content or format of prescription drug labeling. Rather, relevant statutory text 
reveals that Congress was content to allow case-by-case enforcement of its ban on mis­
branded and false and misleading labeling. Indeed, the history of the HDAs reveals 
that Congress deliberately acted to preserve case-by-case, adjudicatory enforcement, 
even as to the important decision of whether particular drugs would be deemed pre­
scription drugs. With prescription drugs, the uses evolve over time, and post-marketing 
adverse events create an ever-changing safety environment for every drug. Continued 
application of the misbranding provisions shows that Congress intended that federal 
law would continue to apply and that a federal agency would continue to monitor the 
circumstances surrounding the marketing and use of a particular drug. However, there 
is no indication that Congress intended to preclude additional monitoring by way of 
state tort law. 
185. Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Label­
ing for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434,37,435-37 (June 26, 1979) (codi­
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courts have historically adopted the view that FDA approval of la­
beling does not warrant preemption of state law.186 These courts 
generally found that the FDA's labeling decisions in the premarket­
approval process imposed only minimum standards, that is, stan­
dards that are "open to supplementation";187 or cited to FDA regu­
lations that allow a drug manufacturer to strengthen warnings in a 
timely manner when new risk information surfaces.l88 The courts 
also rejected the argument that state tort actions are impliedly pre­
empted because they would frustrate the objectives underlying fed­
erallaw. 189 
Importantly, in recent cases where courts have used only a 
traditional preemption analysis, the fact of the agency's shift in view 
has raised complex issues related to the appropriate level of defer­
ence that courts should accord the agency's interpretation of con­
gressional intent.190 In contrast, in conducting a totality of the 
circumstances analysis for the purpose of identifying the source of 
the intent to preempt, the issue of the agency's shift does not raise 
questions of deference. Instead, the agency's shift becomes other 
important relevant evidence that should be accorded weight in the 
analysis. 
The evidence is important because it strongly reinforces the 
conclusion flowing from the foregoing historical analysis. That is, 
the early expressed view of the FDA-and the judicial understand­
ing of the lack of preemptive effect of the FDA's labeling deci­
sions-readily supports the view that the source of the preemption 
that is now being asserted by the FDA is not actually Congress via 
the statute. Rather, it is the FDA via the ever-broadening scope of 
fied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201, 202). The FDA in 1979 frankly acknowledged that the 
information on labels would reflect less than current medical and scientific knowledge. 
[d. at 37,436. The FDA also recognized and did not find objectionable that the labeling 
requirements would, in essence, compel manufacturers to make conservative medical 
judgments to protect themselves from civil liability and that the agency consultative 
process might be used in civil litigation. [d. at 37,436-37; see also supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
186. See, e.g., Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1033 (S.D. 
III. 2001). This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 
129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). See supra note 3 for a discussion of the Wyeth Court's analysis. 
187. See Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1033; see also Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 
1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Ortho Ph arm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746 (11th Cir. 
1986) (HAn FDA determination that a warning is not necessary may be sufficient for 
federal regulatory purposes but still not be sufficient for state tort law purposes. "). 
188. See, e.g., Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34. 
189. See, e.g., Abbott v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1998). 
190. As noted, the analysis of the majority in the Wyeth case also heavily focused 
on the deference issue. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187; see supra note 3. 
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its labeling regulations. If a conflict arguably now exists between 
state common law failure-to-warn claims and FDA labeling deci­
sions, that conflict arose as a consequence of FDA functions, activi­
ties, and objectives that evolved over time. 191 As demonstrated in 
this Article, Congress has provided very little direction to the 
agency relating to regulation of prescription drug labeling. The 
agency created and developed the regulatory scheme. The field oc­
cupied by FDA regulations has grown, and the scope of the labeling 
decision has become more comprehensive.192 
In the case of the FDA activity, then, the totality of the evi­
dence shows that the agency itself initially considered a decision 
approving a prescription drug and its labeling as a decision about 
the minimum risk information that a manufacturer must have avail­
able for prescribing physicians. Only over time did the agency's 
perspective shift as it gradually assumed a more encompassing view 
of its approval decision. At some point during the late 1990s, the 
FDA decided that, in fact, the agency intended the approval deci­
sion to control the totality of the risk information provided. Given 
this set of circumstances-and when combined with the historical 
review that shows that the prescription drug labeling regime has 
always been predominantly within the agency's control pursuant to 
the exemption proviso-it is misleading to characterize the preemp­
tion as arising from congressional intent. A totality of the circum­
stances approach, therefore, enables courts to reach a more realistic 
conclusion about the source of the intent to preempt when preemp­
tion is triggered by an agency's regulatory activity. 
191. Notably, the FDA in the 2006 Rule conceded that the statute technically 
allows a drug manufacturer to add risk information to a label with prior FDA approval; 
yet, the FDA emphasized that prior consultation occurs "in practice." See FDA Re­
quirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Bio­
logical Products,'71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
201, 314, 601). 
The FDA specifically relied on this practice to support its assertion that because of 
conflicting or erroneous judicial interpretations, state law actions could frustrate the 
agency's implementation of its statutory mandate. Id. However, because the statute­
and regulatory scheme-clearly allows changes that strengthen warnings, the real con­
flict is with objectives and activities developed by the agency to serve agency concerns. 
192. See Jordan, The Shimer Analysis, supra note 1, at 107 (making a conclusory 
observation that is confirmed by the rigorous totality of the circumstances analysis in 
this Article); see also supra Parts II.A-C. 
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III. HARD-LoOK REVIEW ENABLES SCRUTINY 
OF AGENCY AUTHORITY 
Using a totality of the circumstances approach and accurately 
identifying cases of agency preemption are important because the 
focus of the preemption analysis shifts when the agency is the 
source of the intent to preempt. As explained, careful analysis of 
the Shimer line of cases reveals that the Supreme Court's inquiry in 
agency preemption cases can readily be characterized as a type of 
hard-look review: a rigorous two-fold inquiry that includes an as­
sessment of (1) the scope of the agency's rulemaking authority and 
(2) whether the decision to preempt can be reconciled with congres­
sional intent.193 As to the second prong, the Court in the Shimer 
line of cases conducted a searching inquiry into the agency's rea­
sons for disregarding state law and affirmatively ensured consis­
tency with goals legitimately attributed to Congress.194 By opening 
the door to careful scrutiny of agency authority and judicial review 
of the agency's policy decision, courts can more readily safeguard 
the federalism concerns associated with preemption of state law by 
federal agency activity. 
Again, the case of preemption arising from the FDA's market 
approval for prescription drugs provides a good snapshot of how a 
hard-look review can provide a meaningful check on preemption by 
federal agencies. Hard-look review requires careful inquiry into the 
scope of the agency's authority in relation to the particular agency 
activity that purportedly preempts state law. In the case of preemp­
tion being asserted by the FDA, it would become important to care­
fully consider the recurring issue highlighted in the foregoing 
analysis regarding the evolution of the agency's regulation of pre­
scription drug labeling. The issue is whether a delegation of author­
ity to exempt, via rulemaking, particular drugs from Congress's 
requirement of "adequate directions for use" includes the authority 
to develop a distinct regulatory regime that imposes detailed and 
comprehensive labeling requirements for exemption. Given the 
history, the analysis involves two distinct issues: whether the au­
thority itself exists and, if so, what is the scope of that authority. 
The easier issue involves the scope of the authority. 
193. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961); supra notes 23-33 and ac­
companying text. 
194. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 382-87. 
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A. The Scope of the Exemption Authority 
As explained, Congress, in section 502(f), specified that drugs 
are misbranded unless their labeling bears "adequate directions for 
use" and 
adequate warnings against use, ... in such manner and form, as 
are necessary for the protection of users: Provided, That where 
any requirement of clause (1) ... as applied to any drug or de­
vice, is not necessary for the protection of the public health, the 
Secretary shall promulgate regulations exempting such drug or 
device from such requirement.195 
Notably, the text of the proviso does not clearly reveal con­
gressional intent to delegate the authority to develop a comprehen­
sive regulatory scheme. Instead, it suggests that Congress simply 
envisioned unadorned exemptions for drugs that were sufficiently 
safe such that directions and warnings were not needed. The 
agency created an exemption for safe drugs,196 but also exempted 
the class of drugs available to consumers via prescription, and, sub­
sequent to the HDAs, the agency significantly expanded its regula­
tory control in its Stage Two approach to prescription drug labeling. 
The agency's Stage Two approach was challenged. In the case 
most on point, United States v. Articles of Drug, the Fifth Circuit 
addressed the issue of the agency's authority.197 Rucker Pharmacal 
challenged the agency's view that prescription drugs are mis­
branded unless they either have "adequate directions" or qualify 
for a regulatory exemption.198 The court's opinion carefully walked 
through this aspect of the regulatory maze, explaining how the 
agency's interpretation of section 502(f) as requiring "directions 
which could be understood for a layman to use a drug safely and for 
195. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 502(f), 
52 Stat. 1041, 1051 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. 352(f) (2000». 
196. See Title 21 Food and Drugs: Food and Drug Administration Promulgation 
of Regulations Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and Repeal of Certain 
Regulations Heretofor Promulgated Thereunder, 3 Fed. Reg. 3161, 3168 (Dec. 28, 1938) 
(specifically, subsection (b)(l), providing an exemption for "directions for common 
uses, adequate directions for which are known by the ordinary individual"). 
197. United States v. Articles of Drugs, 625 F. 2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1980). In 1976 
the FDA notified Rucker that it had determined that three prescription drugs, which 
Rucker had been marketing for several years, were" 'new drugs' for which no New 
Drug Application (NDA) had been approved." /d. at 670. "Rucker refused to cease 
marketing the drugs," and the FDA brought a seizure and condemnation action against 
the company, on the ground that the drugs "complied with neither [the] adequate direc­
tions for use [requirement], nor an agency-created exemption." Id. at 666. 
198. Id. at 671. 
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its intended purpose" meant that prescription drugs could avoid 
misbranding only by falling within the scope of a section 502(f) ex­
emption.199 The argument thus turned on the issue of the agency's 
scope of authority. 
Rucker made the obvious argument that the text of the proviso 
suggests that Congress envisioned exemptions only for drugs posing 
no threat to the public health. The Fifth Circuit agreed that 
Rucker's interpretation was reasonable; however, the court opined 
that the agency's view that prescription drugs pose no threat so long 
as they comply with the terms of the exemption was also reasonable 
and deferred to the agency's interpretation.20o Moreover, the Fifth 
Circuit, in referring to the exemption proviso, noted that "Congress 
... provided for exemptions on terms to be established by FDA"; 
and, later in the opinion, that "Congress has authorized the exemp­
tions and delegated to FDA the duty of defining their reach. "201 
Thus, the court essentially read the text of the proviso as a broad 
delegation of authority to establish terms and conditions that must 
be satisfied to fall within the exemption.202 That view has been re­
affirmed in analogous contexts.203 
199. Id. at 668, 671. The agency's interpretation was issued in FDA regulations 
promulgated in 1952. Id. at 672 (referring to 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1952)). The district 
court had found that the agency's interpretation, as applied to prescription drugs, was 
unreasonable because prescription drugs, by definition, could never satisfy the stan­
dard. Id. at 671. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, looking to the legislative history of the 
misbranding provisions and the agency's consistent use of this view of section 502(f). 
Id. at 672. The appellate court noted that the availability of the exemption rendered 
the agency's approach reasonable. Id. at 673. 
200. Id. at 674. Today, a court likely would engage in more analysis before "de­
ferring" to the agency. See infra notes 224-227 and accompanying text. 
201. Articles of Drugs, 625 F. 2d at 673. 
202. See, e.g., United States v. 9/1 Kg. Containers, More or Less, of an Article of 
Drug for Veterinary Use, 854 F.2d 173, 175-76 (7th Cir. 1988) (construing the phrase 
"necessary for the protection of the public health" as a delegation of authority requiring 
"the agency to make a judgment about where the public interest lies"). 
203. Courts have viewed the FDA's exemption authority similarly in cases ad­
dressing the authority of the FDA to create exemptions pursuant to section 503(a) for 
"bulk" drugs. See, e.g., Arner Co. v. United States, 142 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1944). For 
example, the First Circuit stated that "[s]ection 503(a) does not state the exemption 
[but] '[i]t authorizes the formulation of the exemption by regulations. Therefore, unless 
contrary to law, arbitrary, or unreasonable, the terms of the exemption can be pre­
scribed in the discretion of the administration.'" Id. at 736 (quoting James F. Hoge, An 
Appraisal of the New Drug and Cosmetic Legislation From the Viewpoint of Those in­
dustries, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 116 (1939)); accord United States v. Algon 
Chern. Inc., 879 F.2d 1154, 1158 (3d Cir. 1989). A similar view was also accepted by the 
Eighth Circuit in the context of exemptions relating to investigational use of drugs pur­
suant to section 505(i). See United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451, 455-57 (8th Cir. 
1994). Thus, courts have readily accepted the view that, in giving the agency the author­
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The Fifth Circuit also held that the FDA's requirements for 
prescription drug labeling, as they existed in 1976, were not 
arbitrary: 
By defining more explicitly the statute's terms and creating 
applicable regulations, FDA ensures that a physician is able to 
prescribe drugs safely and efficaciously. The agency's overall 
scheme reasonably enhances the statutory purpose without con­
travening any of its provisions. The agency's approach is reason­
able, and is not due to be invalidated.204 
Thus, if the issue is the scope of the agency's authority or 
whether the agency's approach to prescription drug labeling has 
been reasonable, the regulatory scheme imposing requirements will 
likely be found acceptable. Hard-look review of the agency's pre­
emption decision, however, exceeds these issues. The review must 
ensure that Congress actually delegated to the agency the authority 
to promulgate the regulations giving rise to the purported preemp­
tion. In the case of preemption by the FDA's regulatory activity, 
the inquiry must focus on the impact of the HDAs on agency 
authority. 
B. The HDAs and Agency Authority 
As the historical analysis explained, the agency construed Con­
gress's enactment of the HDAs as a green light for its more exten­
sive Stage Two regulations.205 However, courts have not addressed 
this issue directly. In a hard-look review of an agency's preemption 
decision, it is appropriate to explore whether the text and legislative 
history of the HDAs shed light on congressional intent relating to 
the need for agency authority under the section S02(f) exemption 
proviso, as applied to the new, statutorily recognized class of pre­
scription drugs. Notably, the analysis highlights the extent to which 
the agency's authority is grounded in inference and acquiescence, 
which, in turn, has significance in a hard-look review of the agency's 
preemption decision. 
In the HDAs, Congress clearly differentiated between classes 
of drugs, requiring that certain drugs be available to consumers 
ity to grant exemptions from Congress's requirements, Congress also delegated author­
ity to define the scope of any exemptions and to create terms and conditions that must 
be satisfied for a drug to be entitled to the exemptions. Id. at 456-57. 
204. Articles of Drug, 625 F.2d at 675. 
205. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
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only upon proper prescription, or a refilling thereof.206 Congress 
also specified that only prescription drugs could lawfully carry the 
"cautionary legend," and exempted those drugs from section 
502(f)'s labeling requirements upon being "dispensed."207 In set­
ting the standard for identifying how to determine which drugs 
would be deemed prescription drugs, Congress rejected the idea of 
delegating to the agency the authority to develop an administrative 
list of prescription drugs, opting instead to preserve a role for indus­
try in making the determination. The issue then is whether Con­
gress, through the HDAs, intended to authorize the agency to 
develop a distinct and comprehensive scheme of regulation for pre­
scription drug labeling. Or, instead, did Congress eliminate the 
need for agency authority over prescription drug labeling because 
the labels were not for consumers, thereby electing to preserve in­
dustry's role by leaving the content of labeling as a matter between 
the drug industry and prescribing health care practitioners? 
On the one hand, the actual text of the HDAs regulates the 
content of prescription drug labeling. Paragraph (1) of amended 
subsection 503(b) provides the statutory standards for the new class 
of drugs and imposes the requirement that these drugs may be dis­
pensed only upon a proper prescription or proper refill of a pre­
scription.208 Paragraph (2) creates the exemption from section 
502(f)'s labeling requirements at the point in time when the pre­
scription drugs are dispensed.209 Paragraph (4) then provides that: 
A drug which is subject to paragraph (1) of this subsection 
shall be deemed to be misbranded if at any time prior to dispens­
ing its label fails to bear the statement "Caution: Federal law 
prohibits dispensing without prescription". A drug to which 
paragraph (1) ... does not apply shall be deemed to be 
misbranded if at any time prior to dispensing its label bears the 
caution statement quoted in the preceding sentence.210 
Thus, the text of the HDAs could be construed as establishing the 
way-the one way-in which a prescription drug could be deemed 
misbranded before the point of dispensing. 
The legislative history lends some support to that interpreta­
tion. The Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
206. Humphrey-Durham Amendments, ch. 578, § 1, 65 Stat. 648, 648-49 (1951) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 353 (2000)). 
207. Id.; see also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
208. See Humphrey-Durham Amendments § l(b)(l). 
209. /d. § 1(b)(2). 
210. Id. § 1(b)(4). 
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noted that the "bill amends the [FDCA] to deal more directly and 
realistically with the labeling and dispensing of drugs that may be 
sold only upon the prescription of licensed practitioners."211 More 
specifically, the Report states that "[t]he bill provides a statutory 
definition of prescription drugs; it expressly forbids their sale with­
out a prescription; it specifies how they are to be labeled both at the 
time of interstate shipment and at the time ofultimate dispensing; and 
it prohibits unauthorized refilling of prescriptions for them."212 
Thus, the HDAs could be construed as legislatively putting in 
place-on a selective basis-the scheme previously devised by the 
agency, and thereby eliminating the need for further agency regula­
tion of prescription drug labeling via the section 502(f) exemption 
proviso. This construction would make some sense because, at the 
time of the enactment of the HDAs, although the agency regulated 
prescription drug labeling via its exemption authority, the agency in 
its Stage One regulations essentially left issues relating to the con­
tent and format of such labeling as a matter between the drug man­
ufacturers and the prescribing physicians. The HDAs then 
reasonably could be construed as congressional approval of that ap­
proach to the matter-similar to Congress's decision to preserve 
industry's role in deciding whether a particular drug should be 
deemed a prescription drug.213 
The agency, however, construed the effect of the HDAs differ­
ently, as revealed by its continued and expanded regulation of pre­
scription drug labeling pursuant to its section 502(f) exemption 
authority.214 The argument for interpreting the HDAs as not elimi­
nating the agency's 502(f) exemption authority-and in fact ex­
panding it-is one of inference. The key problem that Congress 
sought to address was the confusion resulting from inconsistent 
identification of drugs as "prescription only."215 Thus, the argu­
211. See S. REP. No. 82-946, at 1 (1951), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 131, at 664, 664 (1979) (hearings related to the HDAs). As noted in the 
hearings, "[i]ts provisions are remedial in the sense that they are intended to protect the 
public from abuses in the sale of potent prescription medicines. They will also relieve 
retail pharmacists of unnecessary restrictions on the dispensing of drugs that are safe 
for use without medical supervision." Id. at 666. 
212. Id. (emphasis added). 
213. Under this construction, the agency would still be empowered to regulate via 
section 701(a). 
214. See H.R. REP. No. 82-700, at 7 (1951), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY, supra note 131, at 279. 
215. As a result of the Stage One regulatory scheme, retail druggists were often 
unable to know, until the question was settled by litigation, whether a particular drug 
could be sold by prescription only. See id. at 278. If a manufacturer wanted to avoid 
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ment would go, through the HDAs, Congress addressed that prob­
lem with a few targeted requirements-some bearing on labeling­
but did not intend to preclude the agency from continuing to regu­
late the labeling of the newly recognized class of prescription drugs 
in other ways. The text of the HDAs and the legislative history, 
however, are silent as to this admittedly plausible congressional in­
tent. The issue then is whether the text of the HDAs and affirma­
tive statements in the legislative history should control-or whether 
the silence of the text and the legislative history should control, as 
bolstered over time by later congressional acquiescence to the 
agency's extensive regulation. 
Only one court has squarely addressed this precise issue, and 
its analysis was far from a hard-look review. In United States v. 
Articles of Drugs, the Fifth Circuit upheld this aspect of the 
agency's view of its authority.216 As noted, Rucker Pharmacal Co. 
had challenged the agency's view that prescription drugs are mis­
branded unless they qualify for a regulatory exemption.217 Part of 
Rucker's argument emphasized that "Congress could not have in­
tended that all prescription drugs would be subject to regulations 
only vaguely authorized by the statute," especially in light of the 
text of the proviso that "suggests that [the] exemptions were antici­
pated only in the case of drugs ... posing no threat to the public 
health."218 Although agreeing that Rucker's arguments were rea­
sonable, the court upheld the agency's interpretation, again largely 
out of deference to the agency.219 For example, regarding the issue 
of the existence of the agency's authority, the court noted that the 
agency had used its exemption authority to regulate prescription 
drugs since 1938. Moreover, in amending the FDCA, "Congress 
did not see fit to eliminate or modify a regulatory scheme which 
provided for a prescription drug exemption."22o According to the 
court, "[A]n agency's long-standing construction of its statutory 
preparing "adequate directions for use," the manufacturer could decide to make the 
drug prescription-only through use of the "cautionary legend." If the druggist thought 
otherwise, and wanted to sell the drug to a consumer, the druggist was left with the 
responsibility of preparing "adequate directions for use" for the consumer. Id. at 281. 
216. United States v. Articles of Drugs, 625 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1980); see supra 
note 197 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. 
218. Articles of Drugs, 625 F.2d at 673-74. Rucker's argument, however, was 
weakened by the assertion that section 502(f) itself still applied to prescription drugs. 
219. Id. at 674. 
220. Id. 
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mandate is entitled to great respect, 'especially when Congress has 
refused to alter the administrative construction.' "221 
Notably, the court's analysis suffers from shortcomings. First, 
the Fifth Circuit failed to consider the fact that, given the agency's 
very limited Stage One regulation of the labeling of prescription 
drugs via the exemption proviso, the text of the HDAs itself codi­
fied the essence of the agency regulatory scheme. Codification of 
agency regulation is in itself a means of eliminating agency regula­
tion. Further, even if such codification should not be construed as 
eliminating the agency's regulatory scheme, the scheme to which 
Congress would have acquiesced-at the time of the HDAs-was 
minimal. The Stage One agency regulations regulated the content 
of prescription drug labeling in a very limited way. Thus, even if 
Congress did not intend to preclude agency regulation of prescrip­
tion drug labeling, nothing in the HDAs shows any congressional 
intent to expand agency regulation of the content of prescription 
drug labeling. 
Moreover, resolving the issue solely as a matter of deference to 
the agency's interpretation is inappropriate. In fact, five years after 
the Fifth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court in Chevron u.s.A. 
Inc. v. l}/atural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 222 clarified that def­
erence to an agency's interpretation of its enabling statute is appro­
priate only if that interpretation "does not violate plain meaning 
and is a reasonable interpretation of silence or ambiguity."223 
Stated more traditionally, Chevron clarified that a court must first 
use traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine 
whether Congress has spoken to the precise issue. "If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well 
221. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Governors v. First Lincolnwood 
Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248 (1978)). 
222. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
223. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rei. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. 842-45. Notably, some courts have 
questioned whether an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction is entitled to 
Chevron deference. See, e.g., Bush & Burchett, Inc. v. Reich, 117 F.3d 932, 935-36 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (noting the controversy surrounding deference to an agency regarding its 
own jurisdiction, but refusing to decide the question); Otis Elevator Co. v. Sec'y of 
Labor, 921 F.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting the controversy but refusing to 
decide the question). Others have ruled that judicial review is de novo in such a circum­
stance. See, e.g., Bolton v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); United Energy Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 35 F.3d 971, 
974 (4th Cir. 1994). But see Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 380-81 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (listing Supreme Court cases suggesting that the usual rules of deference 
apply even when an agency is interpreting a statute limiting its authority). 
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as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in­
tent of Congress."224 Of course, the Supreme Court has revealed, 
in numerous cases, that what constitutes the "unambiguously ex­
pressed intent of Congress" is far from predictable.225 Therefore, a 
proper judicial analysis of the issue would involve greater scrutiny 
of the text, the legislative history, and the context of the HDAs. 
Under this analysis, it seems unlikely that a court today would 
decide that Congress intended to eliminate all regulation of the la­
beling of prescription drugs. This conclusion is based in part on a 
consideration of the structure of the FDCA, and in part on later 
acquiescence by Congress. First, the text and the legislative history 
of the HDAs can plausibly be read as reflecting Congress's decision 
and directive as to which drugs lawfully could bear the "cautionary 
legend"-but as not otherwise addressing the issue of labeling. 
That is, it is not unreasonable to construe the HDAs as specifying 
how prescription drugs should be labeled during shipment between 
states-but only to the extent of the issue of whether it must, or 
could, bear the cautionary statement. Second, it seems unlikely 
that Congress intended to eliminate application of all of the mis­
branding provisions of section 502. If section 502 remains applica­
ble before dispensing, then subsection 502(f) remains applicable, 
including the proviso that enables agency regulation via the exemp­
tion authority. 
Plus, the argument that Congress has acquiesced in the FDA's 
extensive regulation of prescription drug labeling is stronger today 
than when the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue due to legislation 
enacted in 1988, 1997, and 2007. While not as weighty generally as 
other indicators of congressional intent, the Supreme Court has al­
lowed congressional acquiescence to play a role in deciding ques­
tions of agency authority.226 
Thus, 1988, 1997, and 2007 legislation becomes relevant. Con­
gress, in 1988, established the FDA as a distinct agency within the 
224. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
225. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (In the five-to-four split among the Justices, 
both sides stated that congressional intent was discernable but disagreeing as to what 
the intent was.); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) 
(same). 
226. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (relying on later con­
gressional enactments in identifying Congress's intent as to FDA jurisdiction over ciga­
rettes and smokeless tobacco). But see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 160 (declining to rely on 
apparent congressional acquiescence to the agency's interpretation of "navigable 
waters"). 
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Department of Health and Human Services. In the 1988 legislation, 
Congress noted that "the public health has been effectively pro­
tected by the presence of the [FDA] during the last eighty years," 
and that "the presence and importance of the [FDA] must be guar­
anteed."227 As part of the Modernization Act of 1997, Congress 
expressly set forth the mission of the FDA as that of "promot[ing] 
the public health by promptly and efficiently reviewing clinical re­
search and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated 
products in a timely manner. "228 More recently in 2007, in response 
to recurring post-approval safety problems, Congress delegated to 
the agency greater responsibilities related to post-market risk man­
agement of drugs with the potential for serious risks-responsibili­
ties that generally would come into play in relation to prescription 
drugs.229 While none of these later enactments bears directly on 
FDA approval of prescription drug labeling, they nonetheless can 
be construed as reflecting Congress's approval of FDA regulation 
and, in 2007, as reflecting a willingness to expand the scope of the 
FDA's role-even into the realm of post-marketing relations be­
tween manufacturers, prescribing health care providers, and con­
sumers. Thus, it is reasonable to think that courts would conclude 
that Congress did not intend the HDAs to eliminate agency author­
ity to regulate prescription drug labeling via its exemption 
authority. 
Again, however, it is via hard-look review of agency authority 
that it becomes evident that congressional support for the precise 
regulatory activity at issue is a matter of inference and acquies­
cence. Moreover, it is only via hard-look review of the preemption 
227. See Food and Drug Administration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 502, 
102 Stat. 3048, 3120 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 393 Congressional Findings 
(2000». 
228. See Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, § 406(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2369 (codified at 21 U.S.c. § 393). 
229. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-85, § 901, 121 Stat. 823, 922 (codified at 21 U.S.c. § 355). Specifically, Congress in 
2007 authorized the agency to require post-marketing studies or clinical trials to assess 
for serious risks associated or potentially associated with the use of a drug, or to require 
a "risk evaluation and mitigation strategy" (REMS) when necessary to ensure that ben­
efits of a drug outweigh its risks. Further, Congress authorized the FDA to preclude 
marketing if the responsible entity fails to maintain compliance with the requirements 
of an approved REMS. Id. An REMS at a minimum would require periodic assess­
ments of required studies, clinical trials, or other strategies, such as use of patient pack­
age inserts, communication plans to health care providers, or limits on access, such as 
requiring training for prescribers or monitoring patient use. Id. 
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decision that courts can take into account the fact that evidence of 
congressional support may be so limited. 
Hard-look review empowers a court to consider the extent to 
which Congress would sanction an agency's decision to preempt 
state law. That a delegation of authority to the agency can, at best, 
only be inferred, may be a sound reason for a court to decline to 
uphold the agency's decision to preempt. If Congress did not 
clearly and unequivocally delegate to the agency the authority to 
regulate in a particular area, it becomes difficult to conclude that 
Congress would sanction or support preemption of state law. This 
is particularly true given that Congress intended the overall federal 
regulatory scheme for drugs to protect consumers, and the state law 
being preempted is state tort law that serves as a back-up to regula­
tory failures-and, moreover, when the regulatory scheme pre­
empting state law has been wholly devised by the agency. To the 
extent that a hard-look review serves the role of a presumption 
against preemption, understanding that the delegation of authority 
is a matter of inference and acquiescence becomes important.23o 
Hard-look review-including rigorous judicial inquiry into the 
scope of the agency's authority in relation to the particular agency 
activity that purportedly preempts state law-can provide a mean­
ingful check on preemption by federal agencies. 
CONCLUSION 
When federal agencies take the position that their regulatory 
activities preempt state law and point to congressional intent as jus­
230. Additionally, the 2007 legislation, while perhaps showing acquiescence in 
FDA regulation of prescription drug labeling, arguably cuts the other way on the pre­
emption issue-at least as to the agency's argument prior to 2007. A key impetus for 
the 2007 legislation was the FDA's lack of authority to require drug manufacturers to 
take post-marketing safety actions. Key reports highlighted that the agency rarely used 
its authority to withdraw marketing approval and often was limited to negotiating with 
drug sponsors in developing remedies to potential safety concerns. In the 2007 legisla­
tion, Congress gave the agency some additional post-marketing tools. However, al­
though the agency has the authority to "require" and "approve" an REMS, the process 
leading to an approved REMS still involves "negotiation" with drug sponsors. See id. 
Given the limited ability for the agency to compel drug manufacturers to change their 
labels post-approval prior to 2007-and thus the limited ability to ensure consumer 
safety via the regulatory process-it becomes difficult to conclude that, before 2007, 
Congress would have sanctioned the agency's decision to preempt state tort law as a 
remedy. If that is the case, the arguments developed by the agency beginning in 2000 
and culminating in the 2006 Rule were lacking a sound basis. However, it is perhaps 
less difficult since 2007 to conclude that Congress would sanction a decision to preempt 
state tort remedies. 
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tification of the preemption, courts and litigants should not simply 
follow the agency's lead. Because properly identifying the source of 
the intent to preempt is crucial, courts and litigants should instead 
carefully analyze the entirety of the circumstances. A totality of the 
circumstances analysis may point to the agency-rather than Con­
gress-as the source of the intent to preempt. Properly identifying 
cases of agency preemption would then open the door to an appro­
priate level of judicial review, including judicial scrutiny of both the 
agency's authority and of the policy decision itself. 
